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“REMARKABLE INFLUENCE”: THE UNEXPECTED
IMPORTANCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DECEPTIVELY
UNANIMOUS AND CONTESTED MAJORITY OPINIONS
Linda L. Berger
Eric C. Nystrom*
I. INTRODUCTION
What constitutes judicial influence and how should it be
measured? Justice Antonin Scalia was known for his memorable
phrasing (“this wolf comes as a wolf,” 1 “[l]ike some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie” 2) and for being cited at a rate twice that
of his colleagues. 3 Justice Elena Kagan gave him credit for
transforming “all of us” into statutory textualists and
constitutional originalists. 4 Since his death, critics have provided

* Linda L. Berger, Professor of Law Emerita, William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). Eric C. Nystrom, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History,
Interdisciplinary Humanities and Communication, Arizona State University. Thank you to
our early readers at the UNLV-Stanford-University of Washington West Coast Rhetoric
Workshop at Stanford in 2018 and for later-draft feedback from Linda Edwards, Brian
Larson, Joseph Regalia, Ruth Anne Robbins, Kathy Stanchi, David Tanenhaus, Melissa
Weresh, and David Ziff.
1. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment).
3. Frank B. Cross, Determinants of Citations to Supreme Court Opinions (and the
Remarkable Influence of Justice Scalia), 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 177, 191 (2010).
4. In Scalia Lecture, Kagan Discusses Statutory Interpretation, 8 HARV. L. TODAY 29
(Nov. 17, 2015) (advance toggle on scrubber bar in embedded video to 8:29) (declaring that,
after Justice Scalia’s lessons on statutory interpretation, “we’re all textualists now”), https://
today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation; Nomination
of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62, 81 (2010) (testimony of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan) (noting without mentioning Justice Scalia that the Framers
“sometimes . . . laid down very specific rules” and “[s]ometimes . . . laid down broad
principles,” acknowledging that “[e]ither way we apply what they say, what they meant to
do,” and indicating that “in that sense, we are all originalists”).
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mixed reviews of the extent of his influence on the Supreme
Court, other judges, law students, and the general public. 5
Curious about the broader role rhetoric plays in judicial
influence over time, we undertook a rhetorical-computational
analysis of the 282 majority opinions that Justice Scalia wrote
during his thirty years on the Supreme Court. The resulting
study casts doubt on the ability of judicial authors, including
Justice Scalia, to control their influence on later courts, at least
as far as influence is reflected in citation counts.
Blending rhetorical and computational methods, we
explored potential connections between the rhetorical
construction of the opinions Justice Scalia wrote for the Court
and the ways in which later courts treated them as precedent. 6
One important finding from our study is that relying on only the
vote counts of the Justices obscures the actual failures of
unanimity that may generate long-lasting uncertainty. When
there are concurring opinions in decisions whose vote counts are
unanimous—opinions we reclassified as “deceptively
unanimous”—later courts may continue to debate one or more
issues over a long period of time, and that may result in a “long
tail” of more frequent citations, not because of the majority
opinion’s influence but because of the continuing conversation.
If later courts diverge about the meaning or application of the
rules established in the majority opinion, they may rely on a
concurring opinion that gains or loses adherents over time. In
these circumstances, both the original majority opinion and the
concurring opinion will continue to be cited. And more frequent
citations—to both the majority and the concurrence or
concurrences—will extend long after the debate is settled as
still-later cases recount the history of the dispute. 7
A second finding emerging from our analysis is that Justice
Scalia’s rhetorical statements appeared to be more or less
attractive to later courts depending on the particular rhetorical
5. See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
6. Other researchers sought the same connections. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & James W.
Pennebaker, The Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 892 (“The
significance of opinion language in giving effect to opinions merits investigation. . . .
Opinions are certainly meant as communication to judges deciding future cases, so
language could be measured against precedential impact, including measures such as the
likelihood of an opinion being distinguished in a future case.” (footnote omitted)).
7. For discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 131–38.

RHETORICAL-COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SCALIA OPINIONS

235

context of the later judicial author. Although this finding may
seem obvious, our analysis provided specific details. The federal
courts of appeals, for example, were more likely to “cite” than to
“follow” Justice Scalia’s precedential rules. 8 Perhaps reflecting
both their institutional role and their greater resources, the
federal courts of appeals tended to more extensively discuss
both the arguments made and the rules established in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinions while the federal district courts and
the state courts were somewhat more likely to simply follow the
rules. 9 These tendencies toward more extensive discussion were
somewhat more pronounced when the later courts were writing
opinions they knew would be “reported” rather than
“unreported.” 10
Finally, our analysis illuminates how difficult and complex
it is to discern and describe the effects of rhetorical structures,
argument frames, and word choices on judicial decisionmaking
and opinion writing. For example, we suspect that Justice
Scalia’s stated preferences for constructing particular kinds of
rhetorical rule statements—bright lines, broad categories, strict
limits—may in fact have resulted in more frequent citations,
which some observers might translate into an inference of
greater influence. Our analysis, however, indicates that these
more frequent citations over time often were the result of Scalia
rule statements that either created or contributed to lingering
disputes about interpretation or application or both. 11 That kind
of sustained citation frequency likely is not the long-lasting
influence Justice Scalia sought.
Our purpose in undertaking this rhetorical-computational
analysis was to discern patterns and connections across a
substantial data base and, because of the breadth of the project,
to be able to support our inferential findings with some
8. In using the terms “cite” and “follow,” we are adopting LexisNexis terms of art for
mere citations of a precedential opinion without more (“cite”) as distinguished from
citations that positively “follow” or adhere to an earlier precedent. See text accompanying
notes 128–29.
9. See text accompanying Tables 7, 12, and 13.
10. See text accompanying notes 161–64. As discussed in Part VI, “unreported”
opinions are not literally unreported or unpublished, but instead they are available in both
published and electronic form. More accurately, these opinions are said to lack precedential
value outside the specific line of lawsuits in which they are decided.
11. For discussion of this point, see Part VII.
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confidence. 12 This “medium data” approach 13 provides a larger
and more data-driven perspective than traditionally practiced by
historians or rhetorical analysts, but it remains an interpretive
mode, its data collection narrower and its assessment goals more
modest than those asserted by researchers conducting
quantitative analysis of so-called “big data.” In projects such as
this one, analysis and interpretation of the collected data
proceeds through recursive rounds of hypothesis, computation,
depiction, and further hypothesis. 14
We have made what we think are reasonable assumptions
about the role of judicial discretion and ideology in judicial
decisionmaking. First, we assume that ideology alone does not
drive most of the decisions made by judges, especially judges in
the lower federal and state courts who are bound by vertical
precedent. 15 Second, we assume that these judges—though
bound by precedent—often have choices among the precedents
they refer to, and especially about the manner in which they do
so, including whether to “cite” or to “follow” a particular
precedent. Because we hope to better understand how a later
judge has been influenced to select particular language to rely
upon in an opinion’s reasoning or decision, we necessarily
assume that the later judge was not compelled in every case to
follow an earlier decision. That is, we think circumstances not
controlled by precedent (at least according to the arguments of
the parties) happen frequently enough to make our project
worthwhile. And even when the opinion writer is compelled to
follow a particular precedent, we expect that the judge retains
discretion to choose among the elements in the earlier opinion
and to emphasize those she finds more crucial. When judges are
engaged in this process, aided by the arguments of lawyers for
the parties, they are engaged in “an organized and systematic

12. For discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 43–45.
13. David S. Tanenhaus & Eric C. Nystrom, Pursuing Gault, 17 NEV. L.J. 351, 358
(2017) (crediting historians Kellen Funk and Lincoln Mullen for the term).
14. For discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 46–48.
15. We recognize that higher rates of citation for Justice Scalia’s opinions may be
influenced over time by political appointment patterns, that is, by the presence of greater
numbers of federal district court and courts of appeals judges sympathetic to his views. Our
project did not account for ideological preferences of judges, but unlike many studies, it
did extend to judges at all levels of federal and state courts.
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process of conversation by which our words get and change their
meaning.” 16
We know that language choices govern the content and
affect the lasting influence of judicial opinions because lawyers
and judges treat the words and phrases of earlier opinions as
rules 17 with consequences for later cases. When an earlier
opinion governs a later case, the earlier opinion’s text is treated
as the “repository” of information that determines what the law
is and what its impact might be. 18 But the author’s language
choices alone do not determine the staying power of judicial
opinions. It’s not only the rhetoric selected by the judicial
opinion’s author that determines when, whether, and how a later
judge will pick it up and use it, it’s the complex rhetorical
situation in which the later judge finds herself.
II. THE CHOICE TO STUDY JUSTICE SCALIA’S
MAJORITY OPINIONS
Scalia’s words were his most potent weapon in his struggle
to get the Court to rethink first principles and apply his
views of freedom. . . . But his words were also his greatest
weakness. 19

In 2010, the Cross study of citations to Supreme Court
opinions found an “extremely high rate” of citations to Justice
Scalia’s majority opinions. 20 Professor Cross determined that the
16. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 268 (1985).
17. An early note on one of our own language choices: we use the term “rules” broadly
throughout most of this article, as here, to indicate the universe of legal principles that are
relied upon by lawyers and judges to make choices about what happens in particular legal
contexts. See the discussion in Part VI for more explanation of how we distinguished
between “rules” and “arguments” in the coding process. In Part VII, we discuss the
distinction between “rules” and “standards,” but this is not a distinction that we attempted
to apply elsewhere in the article.
18. Chad Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96
GEO. L. J. 1283, 1328 (2008).
19. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND
THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 7 (2018).
20. Cross, supra note 3, at 191. Professor Cross studied citations to Supreme Court
opinions over a ten-year period, tracing total citations, positive citations, and negative
citations; he used Westlaw’s KeyCite for treatment citations and confined his research to
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number of lower court citations and the number of positive
citations to Justice Scalia’s opinions occurred at more than twice
the rate of the average of other Justices during the period of his
study. 21 Scholarship like the Cross analysis—supported by
Justice Scalia’s nearly thirty years on the Court and his
widespread reputation as a skilled judicial author—bolstered our
choice of Scalia texts as the object of study. 22
Because majority opinions are a richer source for study of a
Justice’s long-term influence, we focused on those 282 cases
rather than on Justice Scalia’s more well-known dissents. 23 We
began with a couple of hypotheses about why Justice Scalia’s
majority opinions might be especially influential, if in fact they
were.

published opinions. Id. at 177–78 (describing selected period and approach), 180 n.8
(describing use of KeyCite), 181 (noting that study’s “data are limited to published
opinions”). In comparison, as will be discussed in Part IV, our analysis relied on
LexisNexis headnotes and Shepard’s treatment citations, and we included both reported
and so-called unreported opinions, distinguishing in some analyses between the two.
21. This was such an important finding that it found its way into the title of the resulting
article. See Cross, supra note 3; but see David Cole, Scalia: The Most Influential Justice
Without Influence in Supreme Court History, NATION (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.the.nation
.com/article/scalia-the-most-influential-justice-without-influence-in-supreme-court-history/
(arguing that to be an originalist is to look backward and that as constitutional law evolves,
originalists are likely to be left behind).
22. An earlier project using similar techniques indicated that the later influence of one
of Justice Scalia’s more controversial majority opinions was limited. Linda L. Berger,
Rhetorical Constructions of Precedent: Justice Scalia’s Free Exercise Opinion, in JUSTICE
SCALIA: RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 197, 212–13 (Brian G. Slocum & Francis J.
Mootz III, eds. 2019) [hereinafter SCALIA: RHETORIC].
23. Justice Scalia’s majority opinions are much more restrained in rhetorical style than
his dissents. His style in dissent likely reflects Justice Scalia’s perspective that the most
important reason for dissenting is that it “renders the profession of a judge . . . more
enjoyable.” As he explained in a 1994 speech,
To be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to
accommodate, to any degree whatever, the more-or-less differing views of one’s
colleagues; to address precisely the points of law that one considers important
and no others; to express precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, or
disbelief, or indignation that one believes the majority’s disposition should
engender—that is indeed an unparalleled pleasure.
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 33, 42 (Dec. 1994).
According to one recent study, and as the reputation of Justice Scalia’s dissents
suggests, the use of memorable language increases the long-term impact of dissenting
opinions. Rachael K. Hinkle & Michael J. Nelson, How to Lose Cases and Influence
People, 8 STATISTICS, POLITICS & POL’Y 195 (2018) (available behind paywall at https://
doi.org/10.1515/spp-2017-0013). But dissenting opinions are, of course, rarely cited.
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A. Rhetoric
Our first hypothesis was the obvious one: Justice Scalia’s
rhetoric, his often-remarkable use of language. But we
considered rhetoric broadly, from the author’s choice among his
sources of support to his construction of argument frames to his
selection of images and words. Professor Cross had suggested
that Justice Scalia’s approach to writing opinions “translate[d]
into considerable precedential influence for lower courts” and
speculated that his “relatively maximalist” approach might be
the reason for his greater precedential influence. 24 Because
whether an opinion is maximalist or minimalist is more a matter
of the scope of the decision than of the doctrine involved, the
distinction is discernible primarily in contrast with the opinions
of other Justices. 25
More generally, Professor Cross had suggested that
fundamentalist opinions—those that, like some Scalia opinions,
make large, sweeping, or broad changes in the law—might offer
more opportunities for citations while, somewhat paradoxically,
opinions that establish clear rules—like other Scalia opinions—
might yield less litigation, and thus fewer citations, than
opinions containing standards. 26 Again, although rules and
standards are notably difficult to differentiate without context
and comparison, we thought qualities such as maximalism,
fundamentalism, and the setting of rules rather than standards
might be detected in the phrasing of Justice Scalia’s majority

24. Cross, supra note 3, at 191. Justice Scalia was first characterized as a “maximalist”
opinion-writer by Professor Sunstein, who placed him at the far end of a continuum on
which a minimalist decision is narrow and shallow and decides no more than is absolutely
necessary to resolve the case. Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2005).
25. One study of the effects of the maximalist-minimalist distinction looked at
differences between the judgments that the Justices reached in the cases and the reasoning
they expressed in their opinions (assuming that narrowness and shallowness would be
reflected in the opinions, not the judgments). The study developed an empirical
measurement for minimalism and concluded that it had a statistically significant effect on
opinions of the Justices on the Rehnquist Court. Robert Anderson IV, Measuring MetaDoctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1045 (2009).
26. Cross, supra note 3, at 184.
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opinions (for example, maximalism might be linked to judicial
expressions of certainty). 27
B. Originalism
Another possible source of influence might be Justice
Scalia’s philosophy of originalism. 28 A number of authors have
challenged the premise that this philosophy had any particular
effects, rhetorical or otherwise, on his opinions. 29 Shortly after
Justice Scalia joined the Court, Professor Sullivan concluded
that his reliance on originalism or traditionalism amounted to a
means of decisionmaking, not an end, because for Justice Scalia,
“the rule’s the thing.” 30 Her conclusion did not change, but
gathered support over time. More practically, the combination of
rhetorical and computational analysis we used for our project 31
simply did not lend itself to tracing the influence of originalism,
which likely would have required experts to read hundreds of
citing cases. Other hypotheses—such as Justice Scalia’s
ideological leadership or his relationships with others on the
Court—were rejected for similar reasons: they had already been
tested by others more expert or they could not adequately be
studied within the parameters of our proposed analysis.
Despite the results of the leading citation studies, some
experts have found that Justice Scalia’s influence with specific
target audiences failed to match the outsize nature of his
27. Even though one hallmark of all judicial opinion writing is the author’s assumption
of the inevitability of the result, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2010–14 (2002), Justice Scalia expressed particularly high
levels of certainty, Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 6, at 889, and consistently led the
Court in his use of intensifiers in both majority and dissenting opinions, Lance N. Long &
William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) Attack: The Theory of
Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933, 952 (2013).
28. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 38 (1997).
29. For example, scholars have challenged the claim that Justice Scalia’s “originalist
textualism” restrained his use of judicial discretion. In fact, “[e]xamination of his rhetoric
evidences that he often is engaged not in the reduction but rather the enhancement of
judicial discretion—his own.” George H. Taylor, Matthew L. Jockers & Fernando
Nascimento, No Reasonable Person, in SCALIA: RHETORIC, supra note 22, at 137.
30. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
78 (1992).
31. See text accompanying notes 75–97.
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reputation. For instance, it was often suggested that Justice
Scalia’s main goal was to reach law students and thus to
influence future generations of lawyers and judges. 32 According
to one study of legal textbooks, Justice Scalia made major
contributions to the legal and interpretive theory these texts
contained even though he often ended up on the losing side in
high-profile cases. 33 Nonetheless, the authors concluded that the
most important factor in whether a particular Justice’s opinions
were included in a casebook was seniority on the Court, that is,
“chief justices and justices who led their ideological wings of
the Court have a great deal of power to assign themselves
opinions that are likely to end up in our casebooks.” 34 Looking
at “how often Scalia’s opinions (for the Court, or his separate
opinions) are excerpted in the principal cases and how often he
is referred to by notes preceding and following the principal
cases,” the authors found that “Scalia is at or near the top of
most of the metrics . . . but he does not tower over the
competition.” 35
Similarly, Professor Hasen concluded after Justice Scalia’s
death that features of his institutional role on the court would
diminish his long-term reputation as an influential Justice. For
example, Justice Scalia was never the swing Justice; he wrote
fewer majority opinions than other Justices; and he wrote few
landmark majority opinions outside the field of criminal
procedure. 36

32. And also, perhaps, to influence the general public. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan,
Justice Scalia’s Bottom-Up Approach to Shaping the Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 297 (2016). See also J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia’s Regrettable
Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 253 (2017).
33. Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Paulson K. Varghese, Scalia in the Casebooks, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2231, 2232 (2017).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Richard Collins, Ask the Author: Antonin Scalia “The Justice of Contradictions,”
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/03/ask-author-antoninscalia-justice-contradictions (transcribing interview with Professor Richard Hasen about his
then-new book—RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN
SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION (2018)—considering Justice Scalia’s career).
Still, Justice Scalia was influential because of the “sheer force of his writing and
personality. . . . He had big ideas and wrote and spoke about them forcefully.” Id. On the
other hand, because “he was also a polarizer, . . . he helped usher in an era in which we
have divided our justices into teams.” Id.
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III. USING CONTENT ANALYSIS
TO STUDY HOW PRECEDENT WORKS
For years, the legal academics studying how doctrine
developed and the political science researchers examining how
judges made decisions remained in separate lanes. While legal
scholars used interpretive methods to identify the core themes
and concepts running through the subject matter of the law,
political and other social scientists were conducting quantitative
analyses that correlated judicial characteristics (political
ideology in particular) with the outcomes of judicial decisions.37
More recently, increasing numbers of researchers have turned to
empirical analysis to examine the content of judicial opinions,
many relying on new linguistic tools. 38
In their comprehensive survey published in 2008,
Professors Hall and Wright emphasized that systematic content
analyses using empirical methods would be relying on the same
raw materials as traditional legal interpretation, studying
“judicial reasoning as expressed through the legal and factual
content of written opinions.” 39 To fall within the category of
systematic analyses included in their survey, a study had to
include three processes: “(1) selecting cases; (2) coding cases;
and (3) analyzing the case coding, often through statistical
37. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). A common criticism of the leading statistical studies of
voting patterns and decision outcomes was the overwhelming emphasis they placed on
“ideological explanations of judicial behavior to the exclusion of legal explanations.”
David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1674 (2010) (citing, among others,
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1904–07
(2009) and Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50
B.C. L. REV. 685, 687–89 (2009)). These studies were said to ignore the opinions and miss
the law: “Merely coding for the outcome misses most of the importance of the judicial
decision.” Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine? 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 517, 524 (2006).
38. Until the last ten years, “[e]mpirical studies of the reasons for which judges employ
certain analytical techniques or justify their decisions in particular ways” were rare. Law &
Zaring, supra note 37, at 1673 (citing, among others, Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative
Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007))).
39. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008).
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methods.” 40 Although not usually thought of in this way, West’s
Key Number System and Shepard’s Citations are longstanding
and widely used examples of content analyses. 41
After an appropriate corpus or set of cases has been
identified, content analysts define a set of elements for coding
the content of the cases. In the Hall and Wright overview, for
example, the authors included only those studies whose coding
process “brought some legal judgment to bear on the judicial
opinions analyzed, such as describing the content of the parties’
arguments or the judge’s reasoning, or studying the influence of
legally relevant facts.” 42 Analysts can then test and evaluate
tentative hypotheses about which factors persuade courts and
they can confirm speculative insights into cases. “Although it is
no substitute for legal analysis, the disciplined reading and
analysis of the cases required to code them for computer
analysis eliminates casual meandering through factors on a caseby-case basis.” 43 Coding provides a check on the analyst and
thus “strengthens the objectivity and reproducibility of case law
interpretation.” 44
Content analysis allows the researcher to find patterns and
associations across opinions and to be more confident that those
patterns and associations are meaningful. This increased
confidence relies on breadth rather than depth. As Professors
Hall and Wright point out, “content analysis reaches a thinner
understanding of the law than that gained through more
reflective and subjective interpretive methods.” 45
40. Id. at 79. They found content analysis studies focusing on specific legal topics,
ranging from administrative law to torts; questions of legal methods; judicial decision
making; and statutory interpretation. Id. at 73. The difference between traditional methods
and content analysis, the authors say, may be analogized as follows: “When Dean Prosser
read cases for possible discussion in his Torts treatise, he was auditioning a crowd of
singers to find the best soloists.” Id. at 76. His goal was to find particular cases that
exemplified specific points. Id. In contrast, content analysts are not looking for soloists.
“Instead, they assemble a chorus, listening to the sound that the cases make together. This
distinction between the collective and individual insights drawn from judicial opinions is
the starting point for the functional differences between content analysis and traditional
literary legal analysis.” Id.
41. Id. at 121.
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id. at 80–81 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 81.
45. Id. at 87.
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Most of the studies that emerge from this kind of content
analysis are descriptive or explanatory—they map rather than
test—and they fall into two general categories: studies that
“examine the background of legal doctrines, case subject matter,
or case outcomes” and studies that “focus on particular
techniques of opinion-writing, such as syntax, semantics,
citations, or reasoning style.” 46 In most studies, “[t]he approach
is loosely structured, calling on the researcher simply to observe
and document what can be found, as a naturalist might explore a
new continent or even a familiar patch of woods by turning over
stones to see what crawls out.” 47 Our Scalia-opinions project
falls into this mapping category, an approach that “contrasts
with more focused analytic projects that use formal, statistical
hypothesis testing to generate definitive conclusions about
cause-effect relationships that have theoretical significance.” 48
A. Rhetorical-Pattern and Word-Choice Analyses
1. Rhetorical Patterns
Studying how judges reason and present their reasoning in
written opinions appears to be a potentially rich application of
content analysis. 49 Given our goals, among the most helpful
examples we studied was Professor Little’s search for rhetorical
patterns in a body of procedural decisions. 50 She identified
possible language patterns in decisions focused on jurisdictional
or related procedural grounds by asking whether there were
recurrent tropes and linguistic devices that served to obscure the
effects of the decisions being made. 51 After completing her
rhetorical analysis of the text, she added content analysis

46. Id. at 90.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Existing research has overlooked “a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions:
their rhetoric,” or their “reasoned arguments intended to persuade.” Chemerinsky, supra
note 27, at 2008.
50. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal
Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 80 (1998).
51. Id. at 80.
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methodology, allowing her to generate the data necessary to
perform complex comparisons. 52
2. Style
Among the most recent content analyses, Professor Varsava
studied the impact of “stylistic features” on the citation of
published opinions issued by the Tenth Circuit from 2003 to
2015. Acknowledging that her results do not prove causality, she
nonetheless concluded that they supported the conclusion that
“judges will cite serious, formal, and solemn opinions over
light-hearted, colloquial, and jocular ones.” 53
3. Word-Choice Analyses
Rather than coding by expert readers, a growing number of
studies rely on a linguistic-analysis program, Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count (LIWC), 54 that counts the words used in
various categories. Some of the results that appeared relevant to
our analysis follow.
Using this tool, one study examining opinions from the
Roberts Court found “significant differences” in the language
used depending on whether the opinion was written for the
majority or was written as a separate opinion, and it found some
differences related to individual authors. 55 Professors Cross and
Pennebaker speculated that language differences detected in
majority and separate opinions indicated the “significance of
compromise at the Court.” 56

52. Id.at 80–81.
53. Nina Varsava, The Citable Opinion: A Quantitative Analysis of the Style and Impact
of Judicial Decisions (Oct. 28, 2018) at 3, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3197209.
54. See, e.g., Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of
Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCH.
24 (2010) (explaining how LIWC was created and tested and indicating that empirical
studies demonstrated its ability to detect social and psychological meaning in a variety of
experimental settings); see also How It Works, LIWC (n.d.), https://liwc.wpengine.com/
how-it-works/.
55. Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 6, at 872–92.
56. Id. at 853; see also id. at 874–75 (discussing repeated circulation of drafts and
compromise involved in preparing majority opinion).
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Another recent study found that lower courts were more
likely to treat Supreme Court opinions positively when the
opinions contained “more certain” language. 57 Earlier studies
had hypothesized more mixed rhetorical effects. Some analysts
argued that an opinion’s use of words associated with breadth
and certainty helped readers better understand the opinion’s
rules. 58 Other researchers theorized that higher levels of
certainty resulted from the opinion’s author expressing or
portraying issues in a less complex way, and still others
suggested that certainty is the result when an author is faced
with an argument that is likely to lose: “winners and losers do
write differently in appellate briefs and opinions depending on
the perceived threat to the writer’s legal argument.” 59 In some
researchers’ opinion, Justice Scalia was not only the most
certain but also the clearest opinion writer. 60
Scholars also differed on whether the use of word choices
thought to reflect cognitive complexity helped or hindered the
influence of judicial opinions. Professors Tetlock, Bernzweig,
and Gallant suggested that greater cognitive complexity is a
strength in judicial reasoning, 61 while Professors Owens and
Wedeking thought it might be a weakness, diminishing the
clarity of the opinion. 62 As for the use of words associated with
emotions, another linguistic study found no great difference in
the levels of anger expressed in majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. 63 The same study found little difference in
57. See Pamela C. Corley & Justin Wedeking, The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The
Importance of Certainty in Language, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 35, 54 (2014).
58. Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the
Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1027, 1029–31 (2011).
59. Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 6, at 873 (noting also that “words of certainty may
be used as a defensive mechanism when a justice is in fact uncertain”); see also Long &
Christensen, supra note 27, at 958–59.
60. The Owens and Wedeking study concluded that Justices Scalia and Breyer wrote
the clearest opinions. Their study found that all the Justices wrote clearer dissents than
majority opinions, and that the clearest majority opinions were the result of “minimum
winning coalitions.” The authors also concluded that “opinions that formally alter Court
precedent render less clear law, potentially leading to a cycle of legal ambiguity.” Owens
& Wedeking, supra note 58, at 1027.
61. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Supreme Court Decision Making: Cognitive Style as a
Predictor of Ideological Consistency of Voting, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 1227
(1985).
62. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 58, at 1038–42.
63. Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 6, at 883.
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expressions of positivity by opinion type, “though concurrences
are somewhat more positive. Per curiam opinions are
remarkably negative in emotionality.” 64
B. Citation Analyses
In contrast with content analyses, citation analyses may
examine only the non-rhetorical aspects of opinions, such as the
legal issues involved or the size of the majority coalition.
Acknowledging that the use of citations is an imperfect proxy
for influence or importance, researchers emphasize that citations
are nonetheless “a facially clear measure of the importance of
opinions, at least within the law itself.” 65 Professors Cross and
Spriggs determined in their study of the “most important” and
“best” opinions and Justices that citation rates for Justices
Thomas and Scalia were “very high.” 66 As Professor Cross had
already suggested in his companion study of Justice Scalia’s
influence, 67 these authors hypothesized that having Justices
Scalia and Thomas near the top and Justice Breyer near the
bottom of their results was “some evidence” for the hypothesis
that maximalist opinions have more influence over time. 68
1. Majority Coalitions
As for the effects on citation patterns of the size of the
majority coalition, results vary. One conventional view was that
the more Justices joined an opinion, the more its precedential

64. Id. at 883–84.
65. Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme
Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 411 (2010); see also id. at 420–30
(describing theoretical basis for citation-based study of Supreme Court opinions. Each
citation is a “latent judgment” that indicates the case being cited is “precedent.” James H.
Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedents, 30 SOC. NETWORKS
16, 17 (2008). Other researchers focus more narrowly on only positive citations. See, e.g.,
Matthew P. Hitt, Measuring Precedent in a Judicial Hierarchy, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 57,
63–64 (2016) (emphasizing importance of later cases following a particular precedent).
66. Cross & Spriggs, supra note 65, at 495.
67. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 3, at 201 (characterizing Justice Scalia as a maximalist).
68. Cross & Spriggs, supra note 65, at 495.
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value. 69 Others argued that the more controversial and important
decisions likely would not be decided by a unanimous court.
Instead, they suggested that the cases that were decided
unanimously were not very interesting to the Supreme Court,
and so they would not be frequently cited by later courts. Others
speculated that when the results were unanimous, the holdings
would necessarily be narrower, and as a result, these opinions
would be less frequently cited. 70 Professors Cross and Spriggs
found that cases with unanimous coalitions were less often cited
by the Supreme Court in the future but that those lesser citation
rates did not hold true in the lower federal courts. 71
2. Longer Opinions
Again, the results have been mixed, but some research
suggests that longer opinions are more likely to be cited in the
future. 72 Some analysts theorized that Justices who are
committed to defining the law and increasing the influence of
the Supreme Court write longer opinions; in comparison,
Justices who write shorter opinions might be thought to be more
open to greater flexibility by future courts. 73
3. Internal Citations
As for the number of internal citations—or the number of
times the studied opinion cited earlier cases—the Cross and
Spriggs study found a “consistently positive and significant
[effect]” between the number of later citations for an opinion

69. Cross, supra note 3, at 193 (citing Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides:
Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J
419 (1992)).
70. Id. at 194 (citing Frank B. Cross, et al., Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme
Court’s Network of Precedents (presented Nov. 2007) (Second Annual Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies)).
71. Cross & Spriggs, supra note 65, at 479.
72. Id. at 480; but see Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and
Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 325 (2013)
(positing depreciation over time as the primary factor in citation rates for Supreme Court
opinions and cautioning against reliance on other potentially relevant variables without first
accounting for the influence of depreciation).
73. Cross & Spriggs, supra note 65, at 480 (hypothesizing that Justices writing longer
opinions might want “to project greater influence over future development of the law”).
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and its number of internal citations. The authors speculated that
the opinions with more internal citations were either actually
“better grounded in the existing law” or more persuasive
because they appeared to have more precedential support. 74
IV. OUR RHETORICAL-COMPUTATIONAL RESEARCH APPROACH
Our project relied on a blended rhetorical-computational
analysis of the 282 majority opinions written by Justice Scalia
while on the Supreme Court. By weaving together rhetorical and
computational methods, we hoped to strengthen our ability to
gauge the influence of precedent on one of the most important
audiences for judicial opinions, the later judges and Justices who
read, interpret, and use them when making decisions in later
cases.
Applying both computational and rhetorical methods to the
construction and reception of judicial opinions has several
potential benefits. First, the study is an effort to chart the
movement and the evolution of legal principles through legal
networks. Because judicial opinions constitute the law, “[t]heir
power is enhanced by the common law doctrine that links them
in a chain of influence and causation—the doctrine of
precedent.” 75 Second, the study attempts to discern and begin to
measure the influence of different rhetorical approaches on
different audience members: “Judges intend their published
opinions not only as a communication to the parties in the
particular case that gave rise to the opinion, but also as a
communication to other judges, other lawyers, other litigants,
and other actual and potential participants in the legal system.” 76
The project applied rhetorical methods to a sample that
appears to lend itself to data analysis, that is, we were reading
and coding the “rules” reflected in the LexisNexis headnotes in

74. Id.
75. Hall & Wright, supra note 39, at 92–93 n.119 (quoting Lawrence M. Friedman et
al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773
(1981)).
76. Id. at 93 n.120 (quoting Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An
Empirical Study of Variation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 357, 364–
65 (2005)).
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all 282 of the Scalia majority opinions. 77 Because they isolate
headnote rules, the LexisNexis editors try to identify each legal
issue discussed in an opinion, label each issue with a headnote
number, and then extract much of the exact language of the
opinion on that point. 78 But they omit all citations to authorities,
including constitutional provisions, regulations, statutes, and
case law, from the headnotes. This means that when we read the
Lexis headnotes, we were reading the text Justice Scalia wrote
with one major omission: the citations to authorities.
As any lawyer will tell you, a statement made in a brief
without a citation to an authoritative source loses much of its
ethos, credibility, and persuasiveness. Headnotes, however, are
not part of the judicial opinion, but instead they are editorial
additions used by attorneys early in the research and writing
process as a way to quickly identify specific portions of an
opinion that might be most useful for their focused attention. For
the attorney reader of a headnote, the ethos function is served by
the implicit citation of the entire statement in the headnote to the
author of the opinion being excerpted.
Our initial goal was to examine the text of each headnote
through a network of lenses suggested by the rhetorical canons
77. Metadata about opinions is derived from the Supreme Court Database. Harold J.
Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger & Sara C.
Benesh, 2018 Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L. (n.d.), http://Supremecourtdatabase
.org (click “Data,” then “Previous Versions” and then click “Version 2018 Release 01”)
[hereinafter SCDB]. Each opinion’s text was downloaded manually from LexisNexis. Note
that the count of Scalia-authored opinions includes nine “Judgments of the Court”
(decisionType=7), which are opinions on which a majority of the Justices could not agree.
Following SCDB recommendations, these have been included in our data. See SCDB,
Online Code Book—Decision Type, WASH. U. L. (n.d.), http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation
.php?var=decisionType (defining “decisionType=7” as a case in which “less than a
majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice
assigned to write the Court’s opinion” and indicating that cases classified as “decisionType
=7 should be included in analyses of the Court’s formally decided cases”).
78. See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for Curation: The Relevance of Digest and
Citator Results in Westlaw and Lexis, 32 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 13, 18–19 (2013)
(explaining that, to prepare headnotes, Westlaw editors may summarize the legal points in
their own words, but Lexis editors extract the precise language of the case) [hereinafter
Mart, Curation]. The use of LexisNexis and Westlaw headnotes by researchers, both
students and lawyers, raises interesting questions about how the presence of headnotes
affects our unknowing assumptions about what is “important” in an opinion. See, e.g.,
Susan Nevelow Mart, Every Algorithm has a Point of View, 22 AALL SPECTRUM 40
(Sept./Oct. 2017) (surveying differences and similarities in results generated by searching
various legal databases).
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of invention (the creation of arguments), arrangement (the
structure and sequencing of arguments), and style (the words,
phrases, and images chosen to present arguments). Because of
the nature of headnote text, only some kinds of rhetorical
analysis worked effectively as a first level of categorization. We
were able to identify with some confidence the headnotes that
constituted the steps in Justice Scalia’s argument in any given
opinion (labeled “argument” in what follows) and also the
headnotes that constituted statements of what Justice Scalia
likely considered to be the rules established by or necessary to
the decision in any given case (labeled “Scalia rules”). 79
Applying quantitative methods, we moved next to the
immediate audience for his majority opinions, the judicial
authors of later opinions at all levels of the state and federal
court systems. There, we found some tentative linkages between
the rhetorical construction and rhetorical framing of the Scalia
majority opinions and the ways in which subsequent courts
relied upon them. For example, in cases where the later court
might have—or might appear to have—greater discretion, there
is a small but noteworthy difference in citation patterns. 80
A. The Research Question and the Research “Corpus”
Our broad research question was to better understand
whether Justice Scalia’s majority opinions exerted a
“remarkable influence” on particular categories of later judicial
authors—as gauged by citations—and if so, what factors were
important in influencing them. The majority opinions provided a
reasonably convenient and coherent body of his work for study.
To address the question, we gathered all the majority
opinions written by Justice Scalia, from his arrival on the
Supreme Court in the fall of 1986 to his death in early 2016.81
79. The classified data is available as Linda L. Berger & Eric C. Nystrom,
Classification of Majority Opinions and Headnotes Written by U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia (July 12, 2019), DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3333948. We also were able to
identify the headnotes containing the rules that Justice Scalia likely intended to establish as
rules answering the question posed in a particular case as stated by Justice Scalia (labeled
“Scalia-intended rules”). A later research project may examine this connection further.
80. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 192–201.
81. As in the Cross and Pennebaker study, we studied only majority opinions. They
“excluded all opinions of fewer than one hundred words, for which the program’s
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Most lawyers and judges would agree that “what matters is not
merely what the court said [and did], but how it said it.” 82 The
words and phrases used by the court are “regarded as
consequential in (if not dispositive of) a subsequent case even if
the language at issue was not directly implicated in the decision
of the prior case.” 83 Because the text of the opinion is the only
definitive source to which litigants, lawyers, and judges can
refer, 84 compiling the full texts as the dataset was essential. The
number of opinions was large enough to make observations at
scale possible, but not so large as to make assembly of the
dataset impossible.
The procedure involved collecting data from several
sources. The SCDB compiles a range of helpful data about every
Supreme Court case. 85 Using SCDB’s “majOpinWriter”
variable, a spreadsheet was compiled of the 282 cases with
majority opinions written by Justice Scalia from 1986 to 2015.86
Recognizing that “majority opinions” often include
contributions from a number of authors, 87 we concluded after
review that the opinions on the whole reflect Justice Scalia’s
rhetorical work, both in a narrow wordsmithing sense and in the
broader sense of rhetorical structure. Working from the list of
Justice Scalia’s majority opinions, we downloaded each case’s
data from LexisNexis. Both the case opinion and the Shepard’s
reliability was uncertain; these were generally separate opinions.” Cross & Pennebaker,
supra note 6, at 872.
82. Oldfather, supra note 18, at 1327.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
84. Id. (indicating that judicial opinions are “the embodiment of precedent”).
85. See generally SCDB, supra note 77.
86. Online Code Book, Majority Opinion Writer, SCDB, supra note 77 (identifying
“AScalia” authorship as value 105).
87. A majority opinion must be joined by at least half the other Justices on the Court.
Joining the majority opinion does not preclude Justices from expressing significant
disagreement in the kinds of concurring opinions whose importance is underlined by our
study. Court opinions at all levels are influenced by the clerks (if any) who work for the
authoring Justice as well as the Justices in the majority. In this vein, Judge Wald has said
that “the drafting of majority opinions is a delicate political and human relations
undertaking, [which] precludes the exercise of pure stylistic preference by a judge in
choosing relevant rationales, rhetoric, issues, legal doctrines, precedents, authorities, and
even linguistic flourishes.” Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 6, at 875 (quoting Robert F.
Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate Opinions, 1981-82—
Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68
U. CINN. L. REV. 651, 658 (2000)).
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report were downloaded in HTML format, in several pieces if
necessary, and saved with filenames reflecting the SCDB ID and
a standard notation about their contents. 88 After downloading,
checks were made to ensure the completeness and correctness of
the dataset, which ultimately comprised 653 downloaded files.
The Shepard’s reports contained data used to address the
second goal of understanding the reception of Justice Scalia’s
ideas over time. The primary element of a Shepard’s report is a
list of the subsequent cases that cited the opinion being
Shepardized. With such a report for each opinion Justice Scalia
wrote, we had the raw material to see how a crucial audience—
judges, especially in lower courts—interpreted Justice Scalia’s
judicial opinions. Since each citing case was itself a product of a
particular time and place, we could follow the use of his ideas
over time.
The opinion text and the Shepard’s reports provided
another element to explore the reception of Justice Scalia’s
rhetoric. Each opinion, like all opinions on the LexisNexis
database, was preceded by numbered LexisNexis headnotes that
are “key legal points of a case drawn directly from the language
of a court by LexisNexis attorney-editors.” 89 Inclusion of the
headnotes in the online version of a case allows researchers to
easily locate key points in what amounts to a table of contents at
the beginning of the opinion. Having located the relevant
headnote, “you can jump directly to the text point where each
LexisNexis Headnote appears by selecting the down arrow
associated with it.” 90
In a Shepard’s report showing subsequent citations to the
case, LexisNexis also identifies, when possible, the headnote
from the original case that seems to best represent the specific

88. Downloading was done manually through the standard interface and took several
weeks to complete. Professor Nystrom’s “sheptools” programs were specifically created to
work with the saved HTML exported report. The tools were developed against the HTML
versions because they were slightly easier to work with programmatically than other
electronic case reports. See Eric C. Nystrom, Sheptools: Legal History Tools to Manipulate
Downloaded Shepard’s Citation Data, https://github.com/ericnystrom/sheptools (providing
software); see also DOI:10.5281/zenodo.3271794 (same). A caveat: Since these data were
collected, the output format from LexisNexis has changed.
89. Caselaw Summaries and Headnotes, LEXISNEXIS (2008), http://www.lexisnexis.com/
tutorial/global/US/Academic/en_US/summaries_text.htm.
90. Id.
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point that the citing case is invoking. Headnotes are therefore
units of content, smaller than the opinion as a whole, but
composed (with very few exceptions) 91 of the original text from
the opinion and connected to subsequent uses of that case.
Incorporating both treatment citations and citations to specific
headnote numbers allows for finer-grained interpretation and
analysis than analyses based only on citation counts. We
anticipated that (1) the headnotes could give us a more precise
and narrower understanding of how a citing case was reading
and using the original opinion and (2) the headnotes could be
read for rhetorical content and context because they were
excerpts of unaltered opinion text.
With these multiple purposes in mind, we extracted several
types of information from the downloaded files. From the
opinion texts, we gathered the LexisNexis headnotes for each
case as well as the narrative summary information contained in
the so-called syllabus at the beginning of each opinion about the
facts of the case and the judgment. From the Shepard’s report,
we extracted information about subsequent cases that cited each
Scalia case. We also added information from the SCDB about
the case being cited. After processing each opinion and
Shepard’s report, and removing duplicate entries, 92 we had a
total of 2,903 distinct headnotes, and a total of 510,705 citations
to the 282 Scalia-authored opinions. Of these, only 15.5%
(79,254) of the citations lacked any headnote information. 93
B. Our Toolkit
Rather than LIWC, 94 the linguistic analysis software that
has often been used for content analysis, we used custom opensource software to analyze a combination of LexisNexis
headnotes and Shepard’s Citations. The data compilation and
91. LexisNexis editors will change a word or two to make the headnotes readable; for
example, “we hold” will become “the court holds.”
92. Most duplicates were the result of errors in the process of downloading too-large
Shepard’s reports in several smaller pieces, but smaller numbers of duplicates are
contained within the Shepard’s reports themselves.
93. Descriptive statistics derived from tabular data, revision 0519, copy in possession of
authors. This includes a number of corrections by the present authors to the Lexis-Nexisowned data.
94. See Tausczik & Pennebaker, supra note 54.
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analysis techniques used here were developed by Professor
Nystrom in collaboration with Professor David Tanenhaus.95
Professors Nystrom and Tanenhaus characterized their work as
applying what historians have dubbed a “medium data”
perspective. 96 As discussed earlier, this perspective is more datadriven than the approaches traditionally practiced by historians
and rhetoricians, but unlike much quantitative analysis, it is still
primarily interpretive. Our analysis and interpretation proceeded
through recursive rounds of hypothesis, computation, depiction,
and further hypothesis.
The toolkit was first applied to better understand how one
important case was interpreted over time, but the potential to
derive insights from analyzing a corpus of cases seemed clear,
leading to the present project. Several elements influenced the
start of our project. First, as noted above, scholars have
suggested that Justice Scalia’s use of language is linked to the
successful spread of his ideas. A legal rhetorician might closely
read Justice Scalia’s opinions to discern the source of such a
relationship, but would the links hold for the bulk of them?
A second element was the possibility that headnotes,
because they contained the words of the opinion, might be read
for their rhetorical content. True, a handful of text snippets—
especially recognizing that LexisNexis tries to capture only the
“rules” or legal principles stated in an opinion in the
headnotes—represented the opinion as a whole only thinly, but
these particular snippets had been selected to stand in for the
most important points in the opinion.

95. Tanenhaus & Nystrom, supra note 13. Using custom tools to convert a LexisNexis
Shepard’s report into tabular data, Professors Tanenhaus and Nystrom examined how In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which established certain key due process protections for
juveniles, had been cited over time. Tanenhaus & Nystrom, supra note 13, at 358–69; see
also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2011). Professors Tanenhaus and Nystrom used Lexis-generated
headnotes as proxies for the several strands of legal thought in Justice Fortas’s Gault
opinion. Since nearly eighty-five percent of the cases identified in the Shepard’s report as
having cited Gault included a Lexis-provided note about the legal issues (summarized as
one or more headnotes) from Gault that had been invoked in the citing case, they traced the
headnotes singly and in groups to uncover how the meaning of the classic case had shifted
over time. Tanenhaus & Nystrom, supra note 13, at 358–69.
96. Tanenhaus & Nystrom, supra note 13, at 358 (referring to the work of Professors
Funk and Mullen).
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Third, we had already developed some tools and concepts
to make an investigation at scale somewhat more feasible. In the
course of earlier work, major components of the Shepard’s data
toolkit had been built and tested. Further, in thinking about how
to analyze the headnotes, Professor Nystrom took inspiration
from an earlier collaboration with Professor Tanenhaus, in
which it proved relatively straightforward to use a custom
database to present terms to be evaluated in batches by an
expert. 97 Once the evaluations were gathered, they could be
applied to the rest of the data by the computers without further
difficulty. Finally, we began with an explicit commitment to an
open-ended inquiry and an affirmation of our intent to situate
that inquiry in the humanistic traditions of rhetoric and history.
V. WHAT WE FOUND: THE BIG PICTURE
This section establishes overall patterns as a first sketch of
the subsequent history of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions.
First, we explore Justice Scalia’s most-cited majority opinions
as a way to begin to think about explanations for his later
influence. Next, we look at how citation patterns change when
the later court is deciding to “follow” rather than merely “cite
to” a Scalia majority opinion. Third, we explore the effects on
citation patterns of the size and shape of the majority coalition.
Finally, we look at how citation patterns differ by jurisdiction
and level of the citing court.
To begin, our dataset included 282 majority opinions and a
total of 510,705 citations to these opinions. 98 The mean number
of citations for each Scalia-authored opinion is 1811.01, but the
median is only 613, which suggests a distribution heavily
97. Professor Tanenhaus, a juvenile justice expert, see, e.g., David Tanenhaus, James E.
Rogers Professor of History and Law, UNLV WILLIAM S. BOYD SCHOOL OF LAW, https://
law.unlv.edu/faculty/david-tanenhaus (2020) (summarizing professional expertise and
linking to C.V.), had ranked terms from juvenile justice legislation for their relative
association with “punitive” or “rehabilitative” approaches to youth crime. These weighted
terms were then used to calculate an approximation of any particular bill’s degree of
punitiveness. Eric Nystrom & David S. Tanenhaus, The Future of Digital Legal History:
No Magic, No Silver Bullets, 56 AM. J. LEG. HISTORY 150 (2016).
98. We froze our Shepard’s data as of November 2017, due in part to the timeconsuming nature of manually re-downloading Shepard’s reports for all 282 cases if an
update was desired.
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skewed by a smaller number of very influential opinions. About
90% of opinions received fewer than 4648 citations; about 75%
of opinions received 1626 citations or fewer; and the bottom
quartile had 228 citations or fewer. In our data, one opinion got
just two citations, though the opinion with the next-fewest cites
had twenty-four. Eleven opinions received more than 10,000
citations (and the twelfth missed that mark by fewer than 300);
these are listed in Table 1 below.
A. Justice Scalia’s Most-Cited Opinions
Justice Scalia’s most-cited opinions do not constitute a topten list of landmark constitutional rulings. Instead, they include
rulings on issues important to litigants frequently seen in the
federal courts and legal questions likely to recur as federal
judges manage the process of prisoner lawsuits, criminal
prosecutions, and civil litigation.
Table 1
Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions with 10,000 Citations or More 99
Citations

SCDB ID

Reference

Decision

25,982

1993-084

Heck v. Humphrey

Case Name

512 U.S. 477

9-0

24,078

2003-080

Blakely v. Wash.

542 U.S. 296

5-4

21,456

1992-112

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks

509 U.S. 502

5-4

18,840

1991-085

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

504 U.S. 555

6-3

16,257

1990-108

Wilson v. Seiter

501 U.S. 294

5-4

15,924

2003-040

Crawford v. Wash.

541 U.S. 36

9-0

15,382

1986-158

Anderson v. Creighton

483 U.S. 635

6-3

99. The SCDB ID is assigned according to the Supreme Court Term in which the
opinion falls. Supreme Court terms begin on the first Monday in October and continue until
late June or early July. The date of the decision, and thus of the published opinion, may
reflect a different year. For example, Heck v. Humphrey, 1993-084, was published as 512
U.S. 477 (1994).
Note that the vote counts in the column labeled “Decision” are based on SCDB data
reflecting the votes for the majority and the minority opinions rather than on our own
analysis of the size and shape of the majority coalitions as explained further below in Table
4. We also looked at the top eleven Scalia-authored majority opinions counting only
“reported” cases; the numbers of citations of course decreased, but there was little change
in the order of cases cited.
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions with 10,000 Citations or More

Citations

SCDB ID

13,908

1995-081

12,865

Case Name

Reference

Decision

Lewis v. Casey

518 U.S. 343

8-1

1993-047

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

511 U.S. 375

9-0

12,287

1990-124

Ylst v. Nunnemaker

501 U.S. 797

6-3

11,792

2006-037

Scott v. Harris

550 U.S. 372

8-1

The subject matter of these opinions may seem to suggest a
simple explanation for Justice Scalia’s apparent influence as
measured by their later citations: these legal questions make up
much of the federal courts’ dockets. For example, his mostoften-cited opinion, Heck v. Humphrey, 100 is a prisoners’ rights
lawsuit, a category that is among the most often filed and heard
in the federal courts. In fact, the category of “inmate litigation”
is so common that the authors of the Cross study excluded
prisoner “tort actions for liability” and prisoner actions
involving “cruel and unusual punishment” because of their
possible distorting effects on the comparison of citation rates
among Justices. 101 Although excluding these cases makes sense
in a quantitative comparison among the various Justices, we
determined that including their citation rates would inform
rather than distort our more inferential analysis of a single
Justice’s influence.
Based on the Court’s statements of the subject matter of the
controversy, the SCDB first assigns cases to very specific issues
and then groups those together into the broader groups of issue
areas noted in Table 2. 102 As the data in Table 2 suggest, looking

100. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
101. Cross, supra note 3, at 191.
102. When the SCDB identifies the issues, the focus is on the subject matter of the
controversy stated by the Court. Quoting from the SCDB, the scope of these categories is
as follows:
x Criminal procedure encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for
the due process rights of prisoners . . . .
x Civil rights includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to
classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency,
voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. . . .
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at all of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions together, almost twice
as many fell into the area of criminal procedure as any other
issue area, and the top three categories of criminal procedure,
judicial power, and civil rights overwhelmed all other
categories.
Table 2
Issue Areas of Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions,
Number of Citations
Case Issue Area
Citations
% Total Citations
Criminal Procedure

186,946

36.61

Judicial Power

97,149

19.02

Civil Rights

91,462

17.91

Economic Activity

50,726

9.93

Due Process

39,553

7.74

Attorneys

19,785

3.87

Federalism

9826

1.92

First Amendment

7342

1.44

Unions

5145

1.01

Privacy

1229

0.24

Miscellaneous

866

0.17

Federal Taxation

676

0.13

x First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do
note that not every case in the First Amendment group directly involves the
interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment . . . .
x Due process is limited to non-criminal guarantees . . . .
x The four issues comprising privacy may be treated as a subset of civil rights.
x Because of their peculiar role in the judicial process, a separate attorney category
has been created, which also includes their compensation and licenses, along
with those of governmental officials and employees. . . .
x Unions encompass those issues involving labor union activity. . . .
x Economic activity is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort
actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. . . .
x Judicial power concerns the exercise of the judiciary’s own power. . . .
x Federalism pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal
government and the states, except for those between the federal and state
courts. . . .
x Federal taxation concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes.
x Miscellaneous contains three groups of cases that do not fit into any other category.
SCDB, supra note 77 (describing categories in Online Code Book at http://scdb.wustl.edu/
documentation.php?var=issue).
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In addition to interpreting procedural and constitutional
requirements in prisoner lawsuits, Justice Scalia’s most-cited
cases involved constitutional protections in criminal
prosecutions, questions of standing for plaintiffs wishing to
challenge a government agency’s rule, and burdens of proof in
employment discrimination lawsuits. Because these issues are so
likely to recur, we might expect the Scalia opinions for that
reason alone to be among those to which the lower courts are
most likely to turn. But this explanation does not distinguish
Justice Scalia’s opinions from those of the other Supreme Court
Justices who decide the same kinds of legal questions.
In Part VII, we will examine the subsequent citation
histories of some of these most-cited opinions further. To
provide context for the initial presentation of data, following is a
brief summary of the decisions themselves.
1. Case Summaries
a. Prisoner Cases
First, grouping together the prisoner lawsuits, Justice
Scalia’s most-cited opinion is his majority opinion in Heck v.
Humphrey, where the Court held that a plaintiff cannot bring a
§ 1983 claim (a civil action for a civil-rights violation) unless
there has been a previous favorable termination of a criminal
conviction or reversal. 103 Without such a previous termination,
the Court said, allowing the § 1983 case to proceed would be
inconsistent with the outcome of the criminal case. 104
Another major category of prisoner lawsuit is represented
by Wilson v. Seiter, 105 in which the Court interpreted the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as
applied to prisoners’ conditions of confinement. There, Justice
Scalia established a new standard that required plaintiffs to show
both that the conditions were objectively cruel and unusual and

103. 512 U.S. at 487 (holding that a claim for damages in relation to “a conviction or
sentence that has not been . . . invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983”).
104. Id. at 486–87.
105. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
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that they were the result of “deliberate indifference” by prison
officials. 106
In Lewis v. Casey, 107 the Supreme Court imposed standing
requirements that protected state prison officials from federal
court interference. The Court held that finding a “demonstrated
harm from one particular inadequacy in government
administration” would not permit the courts “to
remedy all inadequacies in that administration.” 108
And in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 109 the Court ruled on one of the
questions involved when a prisoner files a habeas petition in
federal court collaterally attacking his state conviction. The
“procedural default” rule says that if the prisoner failed to make
his claim in the manner and within the time required by
established state rules, and the state courts rejected his claim for
that reason, the federal court cannot consider the claim unless
one of the exceptions to the rule applies. Ylst established a “look
through” rule for federal courts when the last state decision is a
simple denial but an earlier decision has a full explanation,
allowing courts to look through intervening decisions and
assume that the later decisions relied on the earlier
explanation. 110
b. Constitutional Issues in Criminal Cases
The second group of most-cited opinions addressed
constitutional issues in criminal prosecutions. In Blakely v.
Washington, 111 the Court held that within the context of
mandatory sentencing guidelines under state law, the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from
enhancing criminal sentences based on facts not decided by a
jury or admitted by the defendant. 112 Because it extended the
holding for the first time to all the states, the opinion was
characterized as “a legal haymaker that has sent the criminal
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 303–04.
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Id. at 357.
501 U.S. 797 (1991).
Id. at 805–06.
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Id. at 303–05.
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sentencing world reeling” 113 and a “sea change in the body of
sentencing law.” 114
A similarly sweeping change occurred as a result of Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 115 holding that
testimonial hearsay is inadmissible at trial unless the declarant is
available for cross-examination. Justice Scalia reconfigured the
standard for determining when the admission of hearsay
statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. 116 Courts subsequently
struggled to define “testimonial hearsay,” again leading to a long
line of subsequent citations.
In Anderson v. Creighton, 117 the Scalia majority opinion
expanded the doctrine of qualified immunity as a defense
available to government officials in actions based on
constitutional torts. A court now asks not only whether the right
allegedly violated was clearly established but also whether a
reasonable official in the defendant’s position would have
known that his or her conduct violated the right. 118
Finally, in the widely discussed Scott v. Harris, 119 the
Court ruled on a fact question on the basis of the Justices’ own
viewing of a videotaped police chase that left the fleeing driver a
quadriplegic. 120 After viewing it, the Court found that the police
officer’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
because his use of deadly force was justifiable. 121

113. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377,
377 (2005).
114. United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).
115. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
116. Id. at 68 “(Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment
demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination. We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial.’” (footnote omitted)).
117. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
118. Id. at 640–41.
119. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
120. Id. at 378–80.
121. Id.; but see id. at 389–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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c. Civil Cases in Federal Court
The third group of most-cited opinions addressed the
process of civil lawsuits in federal courts. Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 122 reemphasized the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff in Title VII employment discrimination cases. 123
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 124 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion established a new principle of federal standing.
Post-Lujan plaintiffs must show that they suffered a concrete,
discernible injury—not a “conjectural or hypothetical one.” 125
The power of federal district courts to exercise jurisdiction
over settlement agreements was the topic of Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America. 126 The Court indicated
in dicta that the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce a
settlement agreement if it either incorporates the settlement
agreement into the dismissal order or specifically includes a
clause in the dismissal order retaining jurisdiction. 127
B. Justice Scalia’s Most-Followed Opinions
When we looked at Justice Scalia’s most-followed—rather
than his most-cited—opinions, there were few changes other
than the expected decline in the number of citations. LexisNexis
assigns subsequent cases to very specific treatment categories
that can be grouped into more general categories. For example,
“positive” citations include those that “follow” the precedent
case, while “negative” citations include those that “question” the
original decision or “caution” the researcher about its use. The
most common category, “Cited,” is sometimes characterized as
essentially neutral, but the mere citation of the case has also
been interpreted to indicate that the author accepted its general

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Id. at 507.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
511 U.S. 375 (1994).
Id. at 380–82 (declining to extend ancillary jurisdiction).
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validity. 128 Of the 510,705 distinct citations in our dataset, 75%
are labeled as “Cited” and nothing more (384,410 or 75.27%),
and nearly 80% of the citations in the data at least include the
“Cited” label (408,401 or 79.97%).
A smaller number of citations were labeled by LexisNexis
as having used the case in a more active way. If we include
variations 129 and those cases that have multiple labels identified,
we see 94,490 citations that include the “Followed” label in
some form, which is 18.5% of the total number of citations.
Small shifts in order occurred when we examined the “mostfollowed” opinions rather than the most-cited opinions. The top
eight opinions remained the same and were joined by three more
not far behind on the list of most-cited opinions.
Table 3
Top 11 Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions
with Greatest Number of “Follow*” Citations
Follow* Citations

SCDB ID

12,310

1993-084

7161

Title

Reference

Decision

Heck v. Humphrey

512 U.S. 477

9-0

1991-085

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

504 U.S. 555

6-3

4852

1992-112

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks

509 U.S. 502

5-4

4370

1990-108

Wilson v. Seiter

501 U.S. 294

5-4

3873

1995-081

Lewis v. Casey

518 U.S. 343

8-1

3350

2003-040

Crawford v. Wash.

541 U.S. 36

9-0

2173

1986-158

Anderson v. Creighton

483 U.S. 635

6-3

2104

2003-080

Blakely v. Washington

542 U.S. 296

5-4

1561

1996-056

Edwards v. Balisok

520 U.S. 641

9-0

1415

1993-028

Liteky v. United States

510 U.S. 540

9-0

1297

1987-147

Pierce v. Underwood

487 U.S. 552

6-2

Most notable is the sharp drop in the number of citing cases
that “followed” rather than merely “cited” the majority opinion.
128. Cross, supra note 3, at 182 (suggesting that “[a]ny citation to a Supreme Court
opinion might be regarded as a positive one, in that it recognizes the importance of the
opinion, rather than simply ignoring it”).
129. The category included “Followed” as well as “Followed in Concurring” and
“Followed by Questionable Precedent.”
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The last three opinions were not in the most-cited list, but the
subject matter of each has much in common with at least one
case on the first list. 130
C. Citation Rates by Shape and Size of Majority Coalition
One way to assess the court’s voting coalition is to look at
the number of Justices recorded by SCDB as voting for the
majority opinion or for a minority opinion. Using the SCDB
data, 131 and assuming that a unanimous decision is one in which
no Justice dissents even if there are one or more concurring
opinions, 42.6% of Scalia-authored opinions were unanimous.
By contrast, 39.4% were decided with slim majorities of five or
six Justices, and 23.0% were decided by five-four majorities.
As other authors have pointed out, concurring opinions are
very common in unanimous decisions. 132 Therefore, we decided
that it would be more accurate to take concurring opinions into
account because they so often indicate disagreement with, rather
than “merely supplementation or extension of, the majority
opinion.” 133 In a separate analysis, we counted opinions with
concurrences as “deceptively unanimous” rather than “truly
unanimous.” We extended our counting of concurrences and
partial dissents to our categorization of “strong majority” and
“contested majority” opinions. As a result, our analysis showed
that only 23% of Scalia-authored majority opinions were truly
unanimous, 20% were deceptively unanimous (that is, there was
at least one concurrence), 21% were strong majority opinions
(with one or two Justices filing full or partial dissents), and 36%
were contested majority opinions (with three or more Justices
filing full or partial dissents).

130. Edwards was another § 1983 opinion; Liteky involved recusal by federal judges
when their impartiality might be questioned; and Pierce was a dispute about attorneys’
fees.
131. Data about majority/minority votes were taken from the SCDB for each of our
Scalia opinions.
132. Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A. Posner, Are Even Unanimous
Decisions in the United States Supreme Court Ideological? 106 NW. U.L. REV. 699, 700
(2012) (noting that “41% of the unanimous decisions in The Supreme Court Database
include concurring opinions, compared to 38% for non-unanimous decisions”).
133. Id.
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Table 4
Degree of Unanimity, Number and Percentage of Opinions,
and Citations to Opinions

Majority Coalition

Scalia Opinions

% Opinions

Citations

% Citations

Truly Unanimous

65

23.13

72,373

14.19

Deceptively Unanimous

57

20.28

136,840

26.83

Strong Majority

59

21.00

95,518

18.73

Contested Majority

100

35.59

205,308

40.25

Using as a baseline the number of truly unanimous
opinions within the database, Table 4 indicates that “truly
unanimous” opinions (constituting 23% of the Scalia majority
opinions) were under-represented in later citations (only 14% of
the citations) while both “deceptively unanimous” (20% of the
opinions and 27% of the citations) and “contested majority”
opinions (36% of the opinions and 40% of the citations) were
over-represented. One possible explanation for this result is
suggested by the history of Heck. 134 The recorded majority-tominority vote for Heck is nine to zero, but the majority opinion
has been described as “a 5-4 decision on the rationale” 135
because of two concurrences, one joined by four Justices. The
Scalia majority (based on a rationale from the common law of
torts) was joined only by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Ginsburg. Justice Thomas concurred, expressing a
completely different view about the rationale, 136 and Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor,
concurred on the basis that the proper way to resolve the case
was to construe § 1983 in light of the habeas corpus statute.137
Justice Souter’s concurrence eventually led to a long-running
split of authority in the federal courts of appeals that at least

134. 512 U.S. 477.
135. Lyndon Bradshaw, Comment, The Heck Conundrum: Why Federal Courts Should
Not Overextend the Heck v. Humphrey Preclusion Doctrine, 2014 BYU L. REV. 185, 193.
136. Heck, 512 U.S. at 490–91 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 503 (Souter, J., concurring) (concluding that “the proper resolution of this
case . . . is to construe § 1983 in light of the habeas statute and its explicit policy of
exhaustion”).
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partially explains the frequency of citations to Heck over time
(as discussed in Part VII). 138
Several other often-cited opinions initially categorized as
unanimous joined Heck as “deceptively unanimous” in our later
analysis. 139 For example, in a related case, Edwards v.
Balisok, 140 Justice Scalia held that the prisoner’s claim for
damages and declaratory relief was not cognizable under § 1983,
because the principal procedural defect complained of—
exclusion of exculpatory evidence as a result of deceit and bias
of the hearing officer—would, if established, necessarily have
implied the invalidity of the deprivation of the good-time
credits. 141 As in Heck, there was a concurrence, this time joined
by three Justices, that expressed the view that some of the
procedural defects were immediately cognizable under
§ 1983. 142 Similarly, in Crawford v. Washington, 143 Justice
Scalia’s opinion overruling Ohio v. Roberts 144 was joined by six
Justices while Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor concurred on
the basis that the judgment followed from Roberts without the
need for overruling. 145 Again, in Liteky v. United States, 146
Justice Scalia’s opinion on federal judges’ recusal where their
impartiality might be questioned was joined by four Justices, but
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was joined by three. 147 Even
though the concurrence agreed with the holding, Justice
Kennedy said that “the Supreme Court’s opinion announced a
mistaken, unfortunate precedent.” 148
138. See infra text accompanying notes 189–94.
139. These were coded by Berger after reviewing each opinion’s syllabus. All
unanimous opinions with concurrences were coded as deceptively unanimous.
140. 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
141. Id. at 648.
142. 520 U.S. at 649–50 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
143. 541 U.S. 36 (2003).
144. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
145. Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that “[t]he
result the Court reaches follows inexorably from Roberts and its progeny without any need
for overruling that line of cases”).
146. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
147. Id. at 557 (Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
148. Id. Our subsequent analysis also changed the shape of the majority coalition in
several most-cited cases that were not first categorized as unanimous. For example, Lewis,
518 U.S. 343, was initially categorized as an eight-to-one opinion, but our later analysis
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D. Citation Rates by Jurisdiction and Level of Court
A Supreme Court opinion may be cited by a federal or state
court at various levels of each jurisdiction. The opinion might be
cited as horizontal precedent on a federal issue (binding as the
earlier decision under stare decisis) by the Supreme Court itself;
more commonly, the opinion would be cited as vertical
precedent on a federal issue (binding as the higher decision
under hierarchical principles) by a federal court of appeals,
federal district court, or special federal court; or by a state
supreme court or state lower court.
Table 5
Citations of Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions, by Jurisdiction Group
Jurisdiction

Citations

% of Citations

Federal Appeals (including SCOTUS)

85,420

16.73

Federal (all other)

352,971

69.11

State Supreme Courts

16,788

3.29

State Courts (all other)

55,486

10.86

40

0.01

Jurisdiction not recognized
Total

510,705

More than 85% of the citations of Justice Scalia’s opinions
came from the federal courts. Citations by other Supreme Court
cases were few (2759 or 0.54% of all citations), an expected
result given stare decisis and the relatively few Supreme Court
grants of certiorari each year. State courts at all levels were
responsible for only about 14% of the citations to Justice
Scalia’s opinions.
VI. WHAT WE FOUND: THE DETAILS
Having broadly sketched the history of Justice Scalia’s
majority opinions in Part V, we describe in this Part our use of
LexisNexis headnotes to explore when, whether, and how later
judges or panels of judges might decide to select specific
indicated that the majority opinion was contested by three or more Justices voting against
some part of it.

RHETORICAL-COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SCALIA OPINIONS

269

language to rely upon for their reasoning or decision in a
particular rhetorical situation.
A. Coding: What Rhetorical Functions Might Be Identified by
Analyzing the Language Captured in Headnotes?
We began by testing whether each headnote, derived as it
was from the opinion’s text, might be effectively analyzed on its
own for evidence of rhetorical framing or structure. Given the
emphasis placed on Justice Scalia’s memorable writing style,
our first approach to rhetorically analyzing the language used in
the headnotes focused on the Justice’s use of surface rhetorical
devices such as vivid images or characterizations. Our more
successful second approach relied on the common syllogistic
structure of most legal arguments. Using a combination of the
language selected by Justice Scalia (primarily, did it state a
proposition that could be applied beyond the present case?) and
the headnote’s place in the argument structure (primarily, did it
seem to lead to the holding and did it appear in the appropriate
part of a conventional syllogistic form?), we classified each
headnote as
x a preexisting rule,
x an argument or a step along the route to a rule, or
x a Scalia-crafted statement of a rule.
To further explain this classification within the framework of a
syllogism, the same statement might be classified as an
argument if it appeared as a “premise” or as a Scalia rule if it
appeared as a “conclusion.” 149
To place the headnotes in the initial schema we outlined—
preexisting rule, argument, and Scalia rule—we created a
website where Professor Berger 150 could read through

149. See Appendix A for examples of our coding of representative headnotes. For
illustrations of how the same statement might be classified as an argument or as a rule, see
Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 813, 819 (2002) (pointing out that opinions are not made up of individual
syllogisms but instead are “chains of syllogisms . . ., in which the conclusions of
syllogisms earlier in the chain supply the premises of syllogisms that are later in the
chain”).
150. When acting individually, the co-authors are referred to by last name.
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preliminary information on each case 151 so that she understood
the overall context of the opinion. She then read through the
headnotes in sequence. The website stored Professor Berger’s
responses in a database, where they were collated with other
data once complete. The website was created out of open-source
tools 152 and was built in such a way that it could be used again
with little or no modification by loading different data and/or a
different set of questions. For a larger project, the website
software could support multiple distinct user/evaluators, which
would be helpful in determining inter-rater reliability. Because
Professor Berger evaluated each headnote for this project, we
could consider the entire set as an expression of her judgment
and expertise. After several months, Professor Berger reevaluated and made corrections to the initial coding. In all,
Professor Berger coded 2,903 distinct headnotes, representing
every headnote identified by LexisNexis in Justice Scalia’s 282
majority opinions. Despite the challenges, these headnotes
seemed likely to be our best opportunity to trace at least a
skeletal rhetorical structure from 282 cases in fragmentary form
across half a million citations and nearly three decades.
B. Hypothesizing and Testing: How Do Later Courts
Choose Among “Arguments” and “Rules,” and
Between “Citing” or “Following” Precedent?
Having coded the headnotes as containing either an
argument or a step along the route to a rule or a Scalia-crafted
statement of a rule (and leaving aside the very small number of
preexisting rules), we hypothesized about the rhetorical
situations in which a later court might choose to rely on portions
of a case represented by an argument headnote, a rule headnote,
or (more likely) a combination of the two. Imagining the context
within which a later court might be making these choices was
necessary in order for us to begin to select from among the
seemingly infinite number of potential computational analyses.

151. The preliminary information was the syllabus containing a summary of the case,
the holdings, and the votes. See Appendix A for examples.
152. The pages were written in PHP and utilized some JavaScript elements from
Twitter Bootstrap. The database back-end was SQLite.
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Generating these hypotheses helped shape our initial
computations. An important note about the data to follow: each
record of the citation of one case by another in the Shepard’s
data may contain a reference to one or more headnotes. These
are the elements of the cited case (in this case, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion) that LexisNexis determined were at issue in
the citing case. 153 The headnote numbers themselves are those
from the original case being cited (that is, Justice Scalia’s
opinion). If LexisNexis determined that a citing case invoked
principles covered by more than one headnote in the original
case, multiple headnotes may be listed. Therefore, a “headnotecitation” in our data is properly understood as a citation, with a
headnote attached by Lexis to help specify the areas of the
opinion that were invoked when the citing case cited it. The
citing case does not specify the original case’s headnote
explicitly. Since our analysis of “rules” will eventually analyze
the language used in individual headnotes, they must be
disaggregated first. In disaggregated data, each entry (which we
are calling here a “headnote-citation”) represents one headnote
invoked by one citing case. If a citing case was deemed to have
invoked three headnotes when it cited Justice Scalia’s opinion,
then it appears in the disaggregated data three times (once for
each headnote); similarly, if no headnotes were associated with a
case’s citation of Justice Scalia’s opinion, then that case does
not appear in the disaggregated data at all. The 510,705 citations
in our dataset yield 794,060 headnote-citations when
disaggregated.
Of the 2903 headnotes extracted from Scalia-authored
majority opinions that Professor Berger evaluated, 1890 (65.1%)
153. As already noted, Westlaw and LexisNexis prepare their headnote texts
differently. They also use different systems for assigning their headnotes to particular
classifications, as well as different algorithms for linking the headnotes in the original
opinion to the citing references. According to one researcher, “the text of the headnote of
the Shepardized case is compared algorithmically with language from the citing cases to
identify references (within the citing case) that match the language of the LexisNexis
headnote within the Shepard’s report.” Mart, Curation, supra note 78, at 21 (endnote
omitted). According to this author, Westlaw relies on human editing to assign headnotes to
a point in its classification system, while “LexisNexis relies primarily (although not
exclusively) on algorithms to assign a headnote to a topic in the classification scheme.” Id.
at 18, 21. But “both systems use algorithms to link headnotes to matching headnotes in
citing references, although the algorithms are different.” Id. at 21. All this matters because
researchers using different search engines will get different results.
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were deemed to represent “arguments,” 241 (8.3%) represented
“preexisting rules,” and 772 (26.6%) represented “Scalia rules.”
Note that not all headnotes were actually found in headnotecitations. Only 757 distinct “Scalia rule” headnotes, 1828
distinct “argument” headnotes, and 140 “preexisting rule”
headnotes appeared in headnote-citations. When we looked at
citation patterns broadly, the headnotes referring to opinion
language that we categorized as “Scalia rules” were cited more
frequently: they represented 42.91% of headnote-citations
despite being just 26.9% of all headnotes.
TABLE 6
Headnotes and Headnote-Citations, by Berger Rule Categorization
Type

# of HNs

% of HNs

# of HN-Cites

% HN-Cites

Argument

1890

65.11

448,748

56.51

Scalia Rule

772

26.59

340,718

42.91

Preexisting

241

8.3

4589

0.58

The single most frequently invoked headnote-citation, with
18,280 appearances, was Headnote 10 from Heck, 154 categorized
in our rhetorical analysis as a “Scalia rule.” 155 This headnotecitation was invoked 5,000 more times than the next most-cited

154. 512 U.S. 477.
155. Headnote 10 is an unusually long headnote that sums up the general rule of Heck:
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if
the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not
demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the
plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other
bar to the suit.
See text accompanying notes 192–97, infra, for discussion of the rhetorical effect of this
headnote.
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one. The top ten headnote-citations by usage were split evenly
between arguments and Scalia rules. 156
As noted earlier, when examined as a whole, opinion
language characterized as falling into Scalia-rule headnotes was
cited much more frequently than opinion language characterized
as falling into argument headnotes. 157 The mean number of
headnote-citations for Scalia-rule headnotes was 450.09, while
the mean for argument headnotes was 245.49, and the medians,
respectively, were ninety-two and fifty-four. 158 In other words,
later courts relied on Scalia rules much more often than they
cited the language we coded as arguments.
Substantial variation was found from case to case. When a
later judge (or panel of judges) relied on a majority opinion
written by Justice Scalia, it was very likely that the later author
would cite both arguments and rules from the prior opinion.
Which arguments and rules, how many, and the way in which
the reliance was expressed were questions we wished to explore
further.
The headnote citations for a truly “average” Scalia majority
opinion, should one exist, would be about 56% of the argument
type, about 43% of the Scalia-rule type, and perhaps a
smattering of preexisting ones. A few of our most-cited cases
(mentioned in Table 1 above) can serve as examples.
For instance, Wilson v. Seiter 159 had 33,933 individual
headnote-citations: that means among all the citations, from
156. Our rhetorical analysis of some of the most-cited headnotes can be found in Part
VII. See infra text accompanying notes 170–227.
157. Remember that the later judges are not citing the headnotes themselves, but instead
are citing the language of the opinion (which often includes citations to earlier authorities).
LexisNexis has excerpted the language and designated it as a headnote, and we have
characterized that language as an “argument” or as a “Scalia rule.”
158. Scalia-rule headnotes, number of headnote-citations:
x
Mean: 450.0898
x
1st quartile: 27
x
Median: 92
x
3rd quartile: 302.
Argument headnotes, number of headnote-citations:
x
Mean: 245.4858
x
1st quartile: 15
x
Median: 54
x
3rd quartile: 167.
159. 501 U.S. 294).
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courts at all levels, LexisNexis determined that the citing court
was discussing a part of the Wilson opinion represented by a
specific headnote this many times. Of those later citations,
17,891 were citations to the “argument” headnotes in Wilson
(52.7%), and 16,042 were citations to the Scalia-rule headnotes
in Wilson (47.3%). This is reasonably close to the proportions a
statistically “average” case might have.
By contrast, other highly cited cases revealed different
patterns. Heck had 36,242 headnote-citations, but only 26.7% of
them (9673) were of the argument type, while 72.9% (26,410)
were Scalia rules. In Heck, therefore, the Scalia rules were cited
by later courts much more often than the other headnotes, and
more than would be the case in an average Scalia opinion. Two
factors may have influenced this citation pattern. First, as noted
earlier, the decision in Heck was deceptively unanimous, and its
concurrences foreshadowed a continuing dispute. Second, as
will be discussed in Part VII, the general rule stated in the Heck
majority opinion appeared to hold rhetorical appeal for later
judges no matter what their reasoning and judgment in a later
dispute.
Some cases among Scalia’s most cited opinions illustrated
the opposite pattern. In Blakely v. Washington, 160 the argument
headnotes made up 88.9% of the case’s headnote-citations
(30,903 headnote-citations) while the case’s Scalia-rule
headnotes accounted for just 11.1% of the headnote-citations
(3851). Blakely extended a Sixth Amendment right to mandatory
sentencing guidelines under state law, but it specifically
addressed Washington’s sentencing scheme. In this rhetorical
situation—where the state courts in many other individual
jurisdictions were left to grapple with and reason their way
through the meaning or application of Blakely to the context of
their particular state laws—it makes sense that subsequent
decision makers would be citing more argument headnotes than
rule headnotes from Blakely. The explanations of these later
judges would necessarily be more extended than those of
judicial authors who simply follow the governing rule from an
earlier opinion because the precedent case is so similar to the
situation before them. These differentiations suggest that the
160. 542 U.S. 296.
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influence of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions depended not
only on the rhetorical construction of his opinions and his
rhetorical framing of the rules but also on the rhetorical situation
in which the later judge found herself.
C. Rule-to-Argument Citation Patterns
Given variations from one case to another in patterns of
citation, the next question we addressed was whether these
variations could be linked to the jurisdiction and level of court
or to the reported or unreported status of the court’s opinion.
1. Court Characteristics
a. Type of Court: Federal or State
If the headnote-citations are grouped by jurisdiction, do we
see any differences? The table below compares the rule types of
headnote-citations from citing cases originating in federal and
state courts, respectively.
Table 7
Headnote-Citations with Rule Types, by Type of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction

Rule Type

HN-Cites

% of Jurisdiction

Difference: Average of All

Federal

Argument

381,531

56.97

+0.46

Federal

Scalia Rule

283,757

42.37

-0.54

Federal

Preexisting

4402

0.66

+0.08

State

Argument

67,217

54.05

-2.46

State

Scalia Rule

56,961

45.8

+2.89

State

Preexisting

187

0.15

-0.43

Recall that Table 6 showed the average headnote-citations
for all jurisdictions: 56.51% for argument headnotes and 42.91%
for Scalia-rule headnotes. And recall that Scalia-rule headnotes
were cited more often than their frequency (26.59%) and
argument headnotes substantially less often (65.11%). Table 7
indicates that the relative distributions for all federal and all state
courts were fairly close to the norm and fairly close to one
another. Because, as Table 5 shows, by far the majority of
citations to Scalia majority opinions came from federal courts
(85%), it is not surprising that the percentages for the federal
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courts closely matched the baseline. The largest difference
appeared to be the increased proclivity of federal courts over
state courts to use argument headnotes (57% to 54%). In
contrast, state courts cited the opinion language excerpted as
what we have categorized as Scalia-rules headnotes somewhat
more often than did federal courts (46% to 42%). These
differences might be explained by state courts’ tending more
frequently to encounter situations in which they can simply
apply rules rather than engage in the kind of more detailed
reasoning that requires the citation of arguments and rules.
More interesting, however, is the difference in the
argument-to-rule selection rates for the federal and state courts.
In most situations, later courts decided to cite both argument and
rule headnotes. Table 7 indicates that federal courts chose to rely
on argument headnotes 57% of the time and Scalia-rule
headnotes 42% of the time (that is, they selected opinion
language representing arguments 15% more often than they
selected rule headnotes), while state courts chose to rely on
argument headnotes 54% of the time and Scalia rule headnotes
46% of the time (about 8% more often). A greater reliance on
argument headnotes—recognizing that the judicial author is
likely relying on both—may indicate that the author is engaging
in more explanation and exposition.
b. Type of Court: Levels of Federal and State Courts
The next table shows differences with somewhat more
finely divided jurisdiction information. Recall that Table 6
showed that across the whole dataset, 56.51% of headnotecitations are argument type, and 42.91% are Scalia-rule type.
As Table 8 demonstrates, the Supreme Court was the least
likely to cite opinion language we categorized as “Scalia rules.”
When an earlier Scalia majority opinion is cited in the Supreme
Court, the reason most likely is that the issue has been raised
again and so the opinion authors would be more likely look to
the arguments from the prior opinion rather than to the rules. At
the other end of the spectrum, state supreme courts cited Scaliarule headnotes in greater proportion than any other jurisdictional
group. Although not reflected in this table, we found little
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difference in citation rates between the federal courts of appeals
and the federal district courts.
Table 8
Headnote-Citations with Rule Types, by Jurisdiction Groups
Jurisdiction

Rule Type

HN-Cites

% of Jurisdiction

Difference from Average

SCOTUS

Argument

2501

62.68

+6.17

SCOTUS

Scalia Rule

1438

36.04

-6.87

SCOTUS

Preexisting

51

1.28

+0.7

Other Federal

Argument

379,030

56.94

+0.43

Other Federal

Scalia rule

282,319

42.41

-0.5

Other Federal

Preexisting

4351

0.65

+0.07

State Supreme

Argument

15,871

52.69

-3.82

State Supreme

Scalia Rule

14,192

47.12

+4.21

State Supreme

Preexisting

54

0.18

-0.4

State

Argument

51,346

54.48

-2.03

State

Scalia Rule

42,769

45.38

+2.47

State

Preexisting

133

0.14

-0.44

Again, the most striking difference in the argument-to-rule
selection gap is between the jurisdictions. The Supreme Court
cited argument headnotes 62.68% of the time and Scalia-rule
headnotes only 36.04% of the time, favoring argument
headnotes by a difference of 27% (in contrast to the difference
of 13.6% for all jurisdictions). The argument-over-rule
difference for all other federal courts was 15%, and the
difference for the two levels of state courts was under 10%.
c. Type of Court: Geography and Controlling Circuit
The preceding tables indicate that although substantial
variation in the citation use of argument headnotes and Scaliarule headnotes might exist from one case to another, the average
proportions generally remained within a few percentage points
of each other when aggregated on a national level. Table 9,
which appears on the following page, shows notable geographic
variation in citation practice.
In Table 9, which shows only the Scalia-rule figures for
clarity, all courts were grouped by the federal court of appeals
that is controlling in their states and territories. (The Ninth
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Circuit group, for example, contains both the federal district
courts in the Ninth Circuit and the state or territorial courts of
each state and territory within the geographic boundaries of the
Ninth Circuit.) Those courts with nationwide jurisdiction, such
as the Supreme Court and special-purpose courts for patents,
military justice, and so on, are in the “National Courts” group.
The highest and lowest percentages have been bolded, and
because it may be helpful to recall that the average percentage of
headnote-citations to Scalia rules for all courts combined is
42.90%, Table 9 shows that figure as well.
Table 9
Headnote-Citations for Scalia Rules Only,
by Controlling Circuit
Controlling Circuit
HN-Cites
% of Circuit

Ninth

69,907

38.56

Third

27,885

42.01

First

9504

42.64

17,540

42.81

Eighth
Overall Average

42.90

Eleventh

25,918

43.42

Tenth

19,211

43.70

Fifth

32,088

44.07

National Courts

5546

44.27

DC

8642

44.86

Seventh

24,548

45.04

Fourth

26,492

45.06

Sixth

42,361

45.08

Second

31,076

45.97

The highest proportion of headnote-citations came from
cases in the geographic region of the Second Circuit, which
includes New York. This figure was certainly above the overall
federal court average of 42.37%, but was under the 47.12% for
state supreme courts nationally. At the other end, it is striking
how much lower the figure for use of Scalia rules was for state
and federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. The only comparably
low jurisdiction was the Supreme Court itself, at 36.04%, which
is shown in Table 8.
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2. Reported or Unreported Status
Judges might be expected to follow different writing
practices when they are working on opinions that they know will
be unreported. Unreported opinions exist as records of the
decisions in the cases that they decide—and they are readily
accessible on electronic databases—but their precedential value
is limited, at least in federal courts. 161 For any opinion issued on
or after January 1, 2007, under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1(a), attorneys practicing in any federal court may
freely cite to a federal judicial opinion or other written
disposition that has been designated by the issuing court as
“unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not
precedent” or anything similar. Before this rule was enacted, the
local rules of the federal courts of appeals typically restricted or
even prohibited the citation of unpublished opinions in court
filings.
In the early days of the practice, “unreported” opinions not
only had no precedential value, they were difficult to find.
LexisNexis and Westlaw began to offer them for view, and since
2001, unreported opinions from the federal courts of appeals
have also been published in the Federal Appendix. 162 Given
their existence in Lexis without a traditional reporter citation or
in the Federal Appendix, we were able to distinguish
“unreported” opinions in our dataset in two ways: (1) if they
appeared in the Federal Appendix or (2) if the first citation in the
Shepard’s report, which is supposed to be the primary one, is a
“LEXIS” citation, indicating that there are no more-traditional
reporter citations to be had. In Table 10 below, we consider a
161. For discussion of the history and continuing controversy, see, for example,
Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199 (2001); Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma
Marouf, Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683 (2018);
Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S.
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004); Scott Rempell, Unpublished Decisions and
Precedent Shaping: A Case Study of Asylum Claims, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2016).
162. According to Thomson Reuters, the Federal Appendix “is a federal case law
reporter series in West’s® National Reporter System® . . . [that] covers opinions and
decisions from 2001 to date issued by the U.S. courts of appeals that are not selected for
publication in the Federal Reporter.” See Federal Appendix (National Reporter System),
THOMSON REUTERS (n.d.), https://store.legal.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Reporters
/Federal-Appendix-National-Reporter-System/p/100000796.
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case to be unreported if it meets either of those criteria, and treat
any case that fails to satisfy either as “reported” in a recognized
reporter.
Table 10
Headnote-Citations with Rules, by Reporting Status
Rule Type

HN-Cites Reported

% Reported

HN-Cites Unreported

% Unreported

Argument

145,141

56.27

303,607

56.63

Scalia Rule

110,500

42.84

230,218

42.94

Preexisting

2295

0.89

2294

0.43

A first glance at Table 10 suggests that, examined broadly,
reported and unreported cases use the different types of
headnotes in much the same way. The sheer number of
headnote-citations in unreported opinions is also quite striking,
reflecting the large number of unreported cases generally. When
reported and unreported cases are distinguished according to
jurisdictional groups, however—as in Table 11 below—the data
suggest important differences in practice at different court
levels. (The percentage of each reported and unreported courttype grouping that used Scalia rules is bolded, to aid in visual
comparison.)
Table 11
Headnote-Citations with Rules and Reporting Status, by Jurisdiction Group
Jurisdiction

Rule Type

HN-Cites,
Reported Cases

% Reported,
Court Type

HN-Cites,
Unreported Cases

% Unreported,
Court Type

Fed. Appeals

Argument

46,283

58.85

27,149

54.03

Fed. Appeals

Scalia Rule

31,467

40.01

22,848

45.47

Fed. Appeals

Preexisting

902

1.15

254

0.51

Fed. Other

Argument

60,481

57.37

247,618

56.88

Fed. Other

Scalia Rule

43,690

41.44

185,752

42.67

Fed. Other

Preexisting

1256

1.19

1990

0.46

St. Supreme

Argument

147,54

52.38

1117

57.11

St. Supreme

Scalia Rule

13,355

47.42

837

42.79

St. Supreme

Preexisting

52

0.18

2

0.10

St. Other

Argument

23,623

51.70

27,723

57.10

St. Other

Scalia Rule

21,988

48.12

20,781

42.80

St. Other

Preexisting

85

0.19

48

0.10
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In the federal courts of appeals, the judges writing opinions
that would be unreported cited significantly more Scalia rules
and significantly fewer argument headnotes than when they
were writing opinions in reported cases. 163 When federal
appellate judges were writing opinions that would be reported,
they cited the argument headnotes at a rate 18% higher than
their citations of Scalia-rule headnotes, while the gap between
argument headnotes and rule headnotes in unreported opinions
was about half as much. This difference might be explained
because judges writing opinions that they know will be
reported—and that therefore will have precedential value—will
take more time to justify their decisions. As part of the
decisionmaking and opinion-writing process, they may include
more of the reasoning from the majority opinion that they are
relying on, resulting in more citations of argument headnotes as
well as citation to the rules. 164
D. Cite-to-Follow Citation Patterns
If Justice Scalia’s influence were directly linked to the
rhetorical construction of his opinions, we might expect to find
the clearest links in cases where his opinion was followed by the
later court. In those cases, the rule or the argument has a
discernible effect on the outcome, that is, the later judge
“follows” it rather than simply re-stating the rule or the
argument with implicit approval. Most citations in a Shepard’s
report are notes that the case was cited by the later opinion.
Indeed, of the 510,705 distinct citations in our dataset, 75% are
labeled as “Cited” and nothing more (384,410, or 75.27%), and
nearly 80% of the citations in the data at least include the
“Cited” label (408401, or 79.97%). If we include variations 165
163. In the federal courts of appeals, decisions generally are made by panels, but the
opinions are presented as if they have been written by individual judges. We use
“significantly” here not in the statistical sense but in its ordinary meaning.
164. In contrast to the relatively uniform, although controversial, federal practices
regarding nonprecedential cases, the rules and practices for unreported or unpublished
cases at the state level are inconsistent and confusing. Lauren S. Wood, Comment, Out of
Cite, Out of Mind: Navigating the Labyrinth that Is State Appellate Courts’ Unpublished
Opinion Practices, 45 U. BALT. L. REV. 561 (2016).
165. Again, the category included “Followed” as well as “Followed in Concurring” and
“Followed by Questionable Precedent.”
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and those cases that have multiple labels identified, 94,490
citations included the “Followed” label in some form, which is
18.5% of the total number of citations.
1. Court Characteristics
When we grouped the citations by jurisdiction group first,
then examined patterns of Following or Citing, we found some
differences. (Note that other types of treatment are ignored in
Table 12 below.)
Table 12
Citation Treatment of Scalia Opinions Among Different Jurisdiction Groups
Jurisdiction

All Citations

Follow* Citations

% Follow

Cited-Only Citations

% Cited-Only

Fed. Appeals

85,420

13,668

16

61,971

72.55

Fed. Other

352,971

69,967

19.82

269,685

76.4

St. Supreme

16,788

3069

18.28

10,537

62.77

St. Other

55,486

7786

14.03

42,217

76.09

According to these data, the federal courts of appeals
followed Justice Scalia’s Supreme Court majority opinions 16%
of the time, compared with 20% for federal district courts. This
may suggest that the judges who make up the panels in the
federal courts of appeals—given that they generally are the
recipients of more briefs and have greater resources and more
time to devote to the individual case—exercised their discretion
somewhat differently than did federal district judges. A decision
to cite rather than to follow an earlier opinion may indicate that
the earlier opinion will be one of several to be discussed before a
more independent decision is reached rather than the one whose
decision is to be followed.
2. Reported or Unreported Status
Table 13 below examines the same data with additional
attention to the reported status of the case. Here, we found that
the federal courts of appeals were slightly more likely to
“follow” a Scalia opinion if the citing case was reported. This
difference is much more pronounced, however, in state lower
courts and state supreme courts.
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Table 13
Following Citations, by Jurisdiction, Including Reported and Unreported
Citations,
Follow*,
% Follow,
Follow,
% Follow,
Jurisdiction
Reported/Unreported Reported
Reported
Unreported
Unreported
Fed. Appeals
48,189/37,231
8175
16.96
5493
14.75
Fed. Other

64,216/288,755

12,455

19.4

57,512

19.92

St. Supreme

15,245/1543

2917

19.13

152

9.85

25,424/30,062

4741

18.65

3045

10.13

St. Other

E. Effects of Majority Coalitions
As explored above in Part V, the size and shape of the
majority coalition may have an effect on the rate at which a case
is cited. In the corpus of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions, for
example, what Professor Berger labeled as “deceptively
unanimous” cases were 20.28% of cases, but 26.83% of
citations. Similarly, “contested-majority” opinions were 35.59%
of cases, but 40.25% of citations. 166 Table 14 breaks out these
voting-coalition categories by the four jurisdiction groups and
compares how cases from courts in each group differ from the
percentage of citations attributable to each voting coalition when
citations are considered without reference to court level.
1. Court Characteristics
Table 4 showed that the frequency of citations for
deceptively unanimous opinions (26.83%) outstripped their
distribution among Scalia majority opinions (20.28%). 167 The
same was true of the frequency of citations for Scalia contestedmajority opinions (40.25%) compared with their distribution
among his majority opinions (35.59%). But the opposite was
true—fewer citations than percentage of total opinions—for
truly unanimous and strong majority opinions. Thus, Table 14
below suggests that while the over-representation of deceptively
unanimous and contested majority opinions affects all levels of
courts, the relatively higher than expected citation rates for
deceptively unanimous opinions were linked to the federal
166. See Table 4, supra page 266.
167. See text accompanying notes 134–48, supra.
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district courts while the relatively higher than expected citation
rates for contested majority opinions were linked to the federal
courts of appeals (as well as to the state courts). One possibility
for the very high rates of citation in the state courts is that the
issues that resulted in those cases being decided by contested
majorities were so controversial that they remained hotly
contested for at least several years after the decisions were
made.
Table 14
Citations by Jurisdictional Group to Cases with Varying Voting Coalitions,
Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions 168
Jurisdiction

Majority Coalition

Citations

% of
Jurisdiction

Difference From Average
for Majority Type in All

Fed. Appeals

Truly unanimous

10,886

12.74

-1.45

Fed. Appeals

Deceptively unanimous

20,234

23.69

-3.14

Fed. Appeals

Strong majority

17,630

20.64

+1.91

Fed. Appeals

Contested majority

36,558

42.8

+2.55

Fed. Other

Truly unanimous

55,063

15.6

+1.41

Fed. Other

Deceptively unanimous

99,621

28.22

+1.39

Fed. Other

Strong majority

68,389

19.38

+0.65

Fed. Other

Contested majority

129,374

36.65

-3.6

State Supreme

Truly unanimous

1715

10.22

-3.97

State Supreme

Deceptively unanimous

3967

23.63

-3.2

State Supreme

Strong majority

2834

16.88

-1.85

State Supreme

Contested majority

8252

49.15

+8.9

State Other

Truly unanimous

4702

8.47

-5.72

State Other

Deceptively unanimous

13,018

23.46

-3.37

State Other

Strong majority

6636

11.96

-6.77

State Other

Contested majority

31,120

56.09

+15.84

168. As discussed earlier,
x Deceptively unanimous opinions are unanimous opinions with concurrences,
x Strong majority opinions are opinions with one or two Justices dissenting or failing
to join the full majority opinion, and
x Contested majority opinions are opinions with three or more Justices dissenting or
failing to join the full majority opinion.
Another study found higher than expected citation rates at the Supreme Court for so-called
“doctrinal paradoxes” (where every rationale is rejected by a majority) but those higher
citation rates were not repeated in the federal courts of appeals or the federal district courts.
Hitt, supra note 65, at 67–68.
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2. Reported or Unreported Status
The voting coalition on Scalia-authored opinions might
also be expected to have an impact on whether an opinion is
cited in cases that are reported or unreported.
Table 15
Majority Coalition on Scalia Opinion,
Citations by Reported/Unreported Status
Reported
Citations

% Reported
Citations

Unreported
Citations

% Unreported
Citations

Truly unanimous

23,784

15.53

48,589

13.59

Deceptively unanimous

32,560

21.27

104,280

29.16

Strong majority

30,646

20.02

64,872

18.14

Contested majority

65,812

42.98

139,496

39.01

307

0.2

359

0.1

357,596

13.59

Majority Coalition

Uncategorized
Total

153,109

Next, we might add to our analysis a finer breakdown by
jurisdictional groupings of the citing courts. Comparison of
Table 15, above, with Table 16, below, suggests the degree to
which courts in different jurisdictions might make differential
use of precedent depending on both the voting coalition in the
precedential case and the reporting status of the case citing that
precedent. For example, contested-majority opinions represent
about 39% of all citations by unreported cases. However, in the
case of the federal courts of appeals, those contested-majority
cases represent almost 45% of citations by unreported cases,
suggesting a willingness for judges who are deciding an
unreported case to use precedent that was decided on a contested
vote.
In Table 16, we compare three factors that may impact
citations of any particular opinion: the jurisdiction level, the
makeup of the original case’s voting coalition, and the reported
or unreported status. 169 Again, what stands out is the state
courts’ high rates of citation to contested-majority cases.
169. A handful of citing cases are missing information for analysis in one of these three
categories, so any citing case without all elements is left out. The percentages are
calculated from the total of citing cases for which all information is known, hence the totals
in the table.
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Fed. Appeals

Table 16
Citations by Voting Coalition, Jurisdiction Group,
and Reported/Unreported Status
Reported % Jurisdiction Unreported
Majority Coalition
Citations
(Reported)
Citations
Truly unanimous
7788
16.2
3098

Fed. Appeals

Deceptively unanimous

Fed. Appeals

Strong majority

10,078

Fed. Appeals

Contested majority

19,844

Fed. Other

Truly unanimous

11,936

18.64

43,127

14.95

Fed. Other

Deceptively unanimous

12,663

19.77

86,958

30.15

Fed. Other

Strong majority

14,491

22.63

53,898

18.69

Fed. Other

Contested majority

24,951

38.96

104,423

36.21

Jurisdiction

Total

10,372

21.57

26.49

20.96

7552

20.29

41.27

16,714

44.9

37,226

64041

288,406

St. Supreme

Truly unanimous

St. Supreme
St. Supreme

Deceptively unanimous

3650

23.97

317

20.54

Strong majority

2602

17.09

232

15.04

St. Supreme

Contested majority

7344

48.24

908

58.85

Total

1629

(Unreported)
8.32

9862

48,082

Total

% Jurisdiction

10.7

15,225

86

5.57

1543

St. Other

Truly unanimous

2426

9.54

2276

7.57

St. Other

Deceptively unanimous

5875

23.11

7143

23.76

St. Other

Strong majority

3449

13.57

3187

10.6

St. Other

Contested majority

13,669

53.77

17451

58.06

Total

25,419

30,057

3. Rule-to-Argument Ratio by Voting Coalition
Our interest in the impact of voting coalitions on
subsequent citations might also extend to look at whether
particular parts of the cases are cited more or less frequently
depending on the vote in the original case. A look at the
headnote-citations classified by the type of rule they presented
suggests that the shape of the voting coalition of the original
case may play a role in what parts of it are used by subsequent
courts.
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Table 17
Rule Types by Type of Voting Majority on Scalia Opinion
Majority Coalition

Rule Type

HN-Cites

Rule % of
Coalition

Difference From Average
for all HN-Cites

Truly unanimous

Argument

58,414

63.3

+6.69

Truly unanimous

Scalia Rule

33,146

35.92

-6.99

Truly unanimous

Preexisting

727

0.79

+0.21

Deceptively unanimous

Argument

100,892

46.35

-10.26

Deceptively unanimous

Scalia Rule

116,208

53.38

+10.47

Deceptively unanimous

Preexisting

583

0.27

-0.31

Strong majority

Argument

78,441

52.23

-4.38

Strong majority

Scalia Rule

71,107

47.34

+4.43

Strong majority

Preexisting

647

0.43

-0.15

Contested majority

Argument

210,680

63.16

+6.55

Contested majority

Scalia Rule

120,257

36.05

-6.86

Contested majority

Preexisting

2632

0.79

+0.21

As can be seen in Table 17 above, Scalia rules were cited
more often when they were found in deceptively unanimous
opinions. The same phenomenon was visible with Scalia rules
emerging from opinions that had a strong but not unanimous
voting coalition. By contrast, “arguments” were cited more
frequently both when they emerged from opinions that were
truly unanimous as well as from opinions that were decided by a
contested majority. Possible explanations for these findings
await further analysis.
VII. THE INTERPLAY OF RHETORICAL FRAMES,
MAJORITY COALITIONS, AND CITATIONS OVER TIME
So far, we have been focusing on one rhetorical function
played by the language excerpted in a headnote: What role did
the language play within the rhetorical framework of the
syllogism put together by Justice Scalia? From the beginning,
we assumed that the language of Justice Scalia’s opinions
influenced the choices made by later judges in ways not
captured by this question. By engaging in rhetorical analysis of
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the most-cited headnotes (a bit of reverse engineering), we
identified some additional potential sources of influence. 170
A. The Rhetoric of the Rule Statement
Much has been written about whether Supreme Court
Justices prefer to state the conclusive principles that summarize
their decisions in the form of rules or standards. 171 Opinions
establishing newly discovered bright-line rules are sometimes
linked to so-called maximalist Justices, and opinions revolving
around more flexible and incremental standards are thought to
be produced by more minimalist decision makers. 172 Whatever
purpose rules and standards serve for the authoring Justice, our
focus was on how the difference might affect the choices made
by later judges as they write their own opinions.
Justice Scalia was known as a proponent of rules rather
than standards, and our rhetorical analysis of his most-cited
opinion language (represented by the top fifty most-cited
headnotes) supported this characterization. Recognizing the
170. The top fifty most-cited headnotes included multiple headnotes from almost all the
top eleven most-cited or most-followed cases (among them Heck, Lujan, Crawford, Blakely,
Lewis, St. Mary’s, Wilson, Ylst, Anderson, and Liteky), plus one or more headnotes each
from well-known opinions including Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.
2551 (2014) (finding the definition of violent felony in the Armed Career Criminal Act to
be unconstitutionally vague); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, (1997)
(holding that Title IV’s prohibition against discrimination because of sex applies when the
harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex); and INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478 (1992) (holding that a guerrilla organization’s attempt to coerce a person into
performing military service is not necessarily persecution on account of political opinion).
171. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
104 (1991); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Sullivan,
supra note 30.
172. See Sunstein, supra note 24. The simplest distinction between rules and standards
is the extent to which the content of the “law” is determined in advance, rules being the
most predetermined. Kaplow, supra note 171, at 559. Professor Sullivan places rules and
standards on a continuum depending on the “relative discretion they afford the decision
maker. . . . A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.” In comparison, a “legal
directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse decision making back into the direct
application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.” For example, the
constitutional law debate between categorical rules and balancing tests is the debate
between rules and standards. Sullivan, supra note 30, at 58–62.
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impossibility of precisely applying the definitions of rules and
standards, we undertook a broad-brush analysis. That analysis
indicated nearly thirty of his fifty most-cited headnotes were
stated in the form of rules, 173 while only twelve qualified as
standards, with the remainder falling outside either category.
From the perspective of the later judge, a precedent stating a
bright-line rule might seem the better choice because the rule
appears to more readily resolve the issue and to be more easily
applied. On the other hand, even though a more flexible standard
might not so clearly resolve the issue, the later judge might
prefer it because it affords her more discretion.
The difficulty of distinguishing rules from standards, and
the complex ramifications for subsequent citations by later
courts, are illustrated by Justice Scalia’s discussion in Anderson
v. Creighton. 174 The Court held there that a plaintiff could defeat
a qualified-immunity defense to an action based on a
constitutional tort only if the constitutional right was “clearly
established” at the time of the government official’s violation of
the right. 175 The “clearly established” language likely was
chosen in an effort to limit unnecessary litigation. But what does
“clearly established” mean? The opinion went on to say that it
“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right” and that “in
the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.” 176 But explanations like these are difficult to apply to
later facts without concrete examples. As a result, even rules
intended to limit debate may generate more, rather than less,
litigation as well as more frequent references simply citing the
original opinion rather than following its rules. 177
173. This includes so-called decision rules. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) (categorizing as decision rules
the Court’s judicial directions about how courts should decide whether operative rules have
been satisfied).
174. 483 U.S. 635.
175. Id. at 638–39.
176. Id. at 640.
177. As in the Anderson example, it is not surprising that a rule requiring petitioning
prisoners to show that prison officials had engaged in the “unnecessary and wanton”
infliction of pain or had exhibited “deliberate indifference” to “serious” medical needs did
not put an end to litigation over cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1991). After Wilson, beyond the need for further
litigation to clarify the application of the standard, debate also continued over whether an
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Perhaps more important to the lower-court opinion writer is
the rhetorical usefulness of Justice Scalia’s rule statements
within the conventional format of judicial opinion writing.
Judging by his most-cited headnotes, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinions provided a ready source of general-rule frameworks,
which are essential to that format. Judicial opinion writers
invariably begin their analyses by stating and citing to the most
general rule that governs the issue before the court. For complex
issues, what’s often most helpful to the current opinion writer is
to find that an earlier author has created an entire rule
framework, one that provides a visual collection and restatement
in convenient and capsule form of the entire structure of the
analysis, together with a corresponding series of statutory and
case citations that add visual and rhetorical weight. The mere
statement of such a rule framework boosts the credibility of the
original and subsequent opinion authors. When he was able to
provide organized and memorable rule frameworks on legal
issues that would recur, Justice Scalia ensured that his opinions
would be looked to as sources of authority in the future.
From the opinion-writing point of view, lower-court judges
likely welcomed this familiar aspect of Justice Scalia’s approach
to precedential construction. 178 For example, the most-cited
headnote in Lujan 179 is a broad general rule that significantly
narrows many plaintiffs’ pathways to litigation. The rule’s
phrasing underlines its potential usefulness to the federal judge
who must decide whether a range of plaintiffs have established
standing, the essential first step to remain in court:
Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
objective or subjective standard was appropriate in the first place. See, e.g., Margo
Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
357 (2018).
178. As Professor Sullivan succinctly summarized Justice Scalia’s approach to
precedential construction:
[F]irst, state the general rule; second, rationalize the existing messy pattern of
cases by grandfathering in a few exceptions and doing the best you can to cabin
their reach; and third, anticipate future cases in which the rule might be thought
problematic and dispose of them in advance by writing sub-paragraphs and subsub-paragraphs qualifying the rule with clauses beginning with “unless” or
“except.”
Sullivan, supra note 30, at 87.
179. 504 U.S. 555.

RHETORICAL-COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SCALIA OPINIONS

291

three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756; Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct.
2197 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740741, n. 16, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972); and
(b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical,’” Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103
S. Ct. 1660 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38,
43. 180

This three-step analytical framework is neatly packaged
and numbered, and Justice Scalia’s word choices seemingly
apply to a broad range of plaintiffs. They limit every potential
plaintiff’s opportunity to stay in federal court because the
minimum for standing is not only a high bar, it is an
“irreducible” one: the injury must be “concrete and
particularized” as well as “actual or imminent”; it must be linked
to the defendant; and it must be “likely” that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
As Lujan illustrates, general-rule statements may be most
valuable to the later opinion writer when they are phrased
broadly, but framed to lead to a particular result. Phrased in that
manner, general-rule statements are set free from the facts of the
immediate case and can be applied to very dissimilar
circumstances. Moreover, the categories constructed and the
definitions provided lead to predetermined outcomes rather than
remaining open to interpretation.
Scott v. Harris, 181 the controversial ruling based on the
Justices’ viewing of a videotape of a police chase, is another
example. In the majority opinion Justice Scalia described the
180. Id. at 560–61 (footnote omitted).
181. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
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pursuit that left a criminal defendant permanently disabled very
differently from the version of the facts that the court below had
accepted as true. 182 Despite the unusual circumstances, the
language captured in Scott’s most-cited headnote is phrased as a
broad general rule. It could apply to any summary judgment
motion in which the judge is able to decide that one version of
the facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record”: 183
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent
must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine
issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,
so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on
a motion for summary judgment. 184

Judging by the most-cited headnotes, later opinion writers
also found Justice Scalia’s statements of policy to be attractive,
perhaps on the same basis as the general propositional rules
exemplified by Lujan and Scott. These policy pronouncements
similarly were framed in a manner that led to a favored

182. Id. at 379–80. Despite the majority’s conclusion, the interpretation of the facts in
Scott might have been found to be very much in contention. See id. at 389–97 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
183. Id. at 380.
184. Id. at 380.
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conclusion, as shown by the most-cited headnote in Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance: 185
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute, see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-137,
117 L. Ed. 2d 280, 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992); Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 501, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986), which is not to be
expanded by judicial decree. American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 95 L. Ed. 702, 71 S. Ct. 534 (1951). It
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. 8, 4
Dall. 8, 11, 1 L. Ed. 718 (1799), and the burden of
establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
298 U.S. 178, 182-183, 80 L. Ed. 1135, 56 S. Ct. 780
(1936). 186

B. Citations over Time
Finally, we used Shepard’s Citations data to uncover
nuanced information about how an opinion was treated by later
courts over time. Based on a comprehensive study of Supreme
Court precedent and in line with other similar studies, Professors
Black and Spriggs reported a typically curved citation history,
with most citations in the early years after the decision was
issued, and then trailing off as the case fell into obscurity.187
Shepard’s data in tabular form can be used in a similar way to
plot the number of citations per year, generating a curve. Spikes
in the curve might indicate a rediscovery of the case, perhaps
because an issue it addressed became newly relevant in society,
or perhaps for more idiosyncratic reasons such as a particular
judge’s affinity for a favorite case. 188

185. 511 U.S. 375.
186. Id. at 377.
187. Black & Spriggs, supra note 72, at 341–43 (including tabular and graphical
information).
188. See, e.g., Tanenhaus & Nystrom, supra note 13, at 365–66.
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1. Effects of Opinion Age over Time
Simply plotting citations by year is less meaningful when
considering 282 cases over a thirty-year period, as in this
analysis. Instead, we adjusted each citation to determine the
“opinion age” when the later opinion cited the earlier case. 189
(That is, a case from 1996 citing a case decided in 1988 would
have an opinion age of eight years.) Grouping and plotting
citations by their opinion age—rather than by the year they were
decided—omits spikes or lulls in response to societal events or
cultural trends, placing emphasis instead on the case and its use
over time.
Figure 1
Number of Citations by Opinion Age,
All Scalia-Authored Majority Opinions

189. This was done by subtracting the year of the SCOTUS term from the year of the
decision in a citing case, provided by Shepard’s. For a more fine-grained measure, it should
be possible to utilize the decision date (MM/DD/YYYY) reported for each case in the
SCDB, but given occasional inconsistencies between the full date information in
LexisNexis and the SCDB, the yearly measure seemed useful enough for our purposes.
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A graph of all the citations of all Scalia-authored majority
opinions, grouped by opinion age, appears above in Figure 1. As
might be expected, citations quickly spiked in the first year or
two after a case was decided and researchers readily found it.
Within a few years, citations began to drop off, but the curve did
not slide quickly toward zero. Between five and fifteen years,
cases saw a steady decline in citation but were clearly still in
circulation. Even more interesting is the bump between opinion
ages fifteen and twenty-three, where the total number of
citations increased, then slowly returned to their previous level.
Beyond an opinion age of about twenty-five, citations declined
rapidly. Because the oldest Scalia opinions are only slightly
more than thirty years old, this trend might need qualification.
2. Effects of the Shape of the Majority Coalition over Time
We found higher than expected citation rates for opinions
decided by contested majorities and for deceptively unanimous
opinions. This result was discussed earlier and illustrated in
Table 4, 190 but is illustrated here in Figure 2 over time.
Figure 2
Citations by Opinion Age, Categorized by Degree of Unanimity

190. See text accompanying notes 134–48.
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As Figure 2 confirms, citation rates started out higher for
truly unanimous and strong majority opinions. Over time, the
opinions that contained alternative reasoning in the form of
concurrences and dissents gained ground.
3. Comparative Histories of Scalia Majority Opinions over Time
To illustrate their different trajectories, Figures 3 through 5
compare the citation histories of six Scalia majority opinions.
Using pairs of cases, the “Follow” citations of a Scalia majority
opinion are compared with the number of later cases that
“Cited” the same precedent case. As discussed earlier, “follow”
citations are clearly positive, indicating that the judge or judges
in the later case are following, or adhering to, the decision of the
precedent case while a “cited” citation reflects a recognition that
the earlier case is relevant as precedent. 191 In Figures 3 through
5, the gap between the two lines—depicted in each figure for
each case in the pair—suggests the gap between the “governing”
influence of the majority opinion, as shown by “follow”
citations, and its usefulness in a continuing conversation, as
shown by “cited” citations.
a. “Live” Issues in Prisoners’ Rights Lawsuits
We classified Heck v. Humphrey, 192 which limited
prisoners’ § 1983 lawsuits, as a deceptively unanimous opinion.
Wilson v. Seiter, 193 which restricted lawsuits based on prison
conditions, was decided by a five-to-four majority. As discussed
earlier, 194 the presence of both concurring and dissenting
opinions may foreshadow continuing controversy, indicating
that one or more issues in the case will remain alive for decades
after the majority opinion. That “live-ness” rather than the
influence of the majority opinion may explain the subsequent
high citation rate. Both in rough outline and in the gap between
the follow and cited citation lines, these opinions affecting
prisoners’ rights lawsuits had similar histories.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See text accompanying notes 128–29.
512 U.S. 477.
501 U.S. 294.
See text accompanying notes 134–38.
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Figure 3
Opinion Age and Citations, Heck v. Humphrey and Wilson v. Seiter

One of the best examples of the deceptively unanimous
phenomenon is Heck, Justice Scalia’s most-cited majority
opinion, and the Scalia rule reflected in its most-cited headnote,
headnote 10. The language excerpted in that headnote pulled
together everything a later judge would need to state a general
rule about § 1983 lawsuits brought by prisoners:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction
or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
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sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district
court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of
some other bar to the suit. 195

The opinion-age curve for Heck shown above in Figure 3
illustrates the historical outcome for this deceptively unanimous
opinion: the issues apparently resolved by the opinion were
controversial for decades. Twenty-five years later, several
circuit splits—the result of the original concurring opinions in
Heck, a follow-up Supreme Court decision, and later “dictaparsing” 196—remained. Among other questions, according to a
petition for certiorari that was denied in January of 2018, the
federal courts of appeals were almost evenly split on whether an
exception to Heck applies when the plaintiff was never in
custody or was so briefly in custody that habeas corpus would
be futile. 197
A different kind of unresolved issue followed Wilson, 198 a
contested majority opinion in which Justice Scalia provided a
state-of-mind definition in the most-cited headnote:
The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666, 8
L. Ed. 2d 758, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962), prohibits the
infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on those
convicted of crimes. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 50
L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), we first acknowledged
that the provision could be applied to some deprivations
195. 512 U.S. at 486–87.
196. John P. Collins, Has All Heck Broken Loose? Examining Heck’s Favorable
Termination Requirement in the Second Circuit After Poventud v. City of New York, 42
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 451, 453 (2014).
197. Pet. for Cert., Henry v. City of Mt. Dora (No. 17-652) (U.S. Oct. 26, 2017), cert.
denied, Jan. 8, 2018, available at https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
11/17-652-petition.pdf. In addition, other disputes remained about whether Heck applied in
particular circumstances. See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the
Favorable Termination Rule Apply to Individuals who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus? 121
HARV. L. REV. 868 (2008).
198. 501 U.S. 294.
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that were not specifically part of the sentence but were
suffered during imprisonment. We rejected, however, the
inmate’s claim in that case that prison doctors had inflicted
cruel and unusual punishment by inadequately attending to
his medical needs—because he had failed to establish that
they possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Since,
we said, only the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’” implicates the Eighth Amendment, id., at 104
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 49 L. Ed.
2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) (joint opinion) (emphasis
added)), a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a
minimum, allege “deliberate indifference” to his “serious”
medical needs. 429 U.S. at 106. “It is only such
indifference” that can violate the Eighth Amendment, ibid.
(emphasis added); allegations of “inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care,” id., at 105, or of a
“negligent . . . diagnosis,” id., at 106, simply fail to
establish the requisite culpable state of mind. 199

Four Justices agreed with the result in Wilson, but they did
not agree that the subjective intent of government officials
should measure Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions of
confinement. 200 As Figure 3 illustrates and as predicted by the
concurrence, basic issues remained open after Wilson, starting
with the intent requirement, which “will likely prove impossible
to apply.” 201
b. Bright-Line Rules Intended to Enforce the Sixth Amendment
The opinion-age graphs in two of Justice Scalia’s Sixth
Amendment opinions, Blakely v. Washington 202 and Crawford v.
Washington, 203 illustrate radically different trajectories.

199. Id. at 297.
200. The concurrence argued that “inhumane prison conditions often are the result of
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison,
sometimes over a long period of time.” Id. at 310 (White, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ., concurring). In those situations, “it is far from clear whose intent should be examined,
and the majority offers no real guidance on this issue. . . . In truth, intent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison system.” Id.
(footnote omitted). See also Schlanger, supra note 177.
201. 501 U.S. at 310 (White, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring).
202. 542 U.S. 296 (2003).
203. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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The Scalia majority opinion in Blakely v. Washington
effectively invalidated key aspects of state sentencing guidelines
for failure to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial
requirement. 204 The ruling questioned those parts of the
guidelines that permitted judges to impose sentences higher than
the presumptive guideline range based on facts found by the
judge using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, rather
than by the jury using the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. 205 After Blakely, state courts faced challenges to their
many distinctive sentencing systems. 206
Figure 4
Opinion Age and Citations,
Blakely v. Washington and Crawford v. Washington

According to our analysis, among the most-cited headnotes
from Blakely is one discussing Washington’s Sentencing
Reform Act, what it specifies as a “standard range” for a
particular offense, and how a judge may impose a sentence

204. 542 U.S. at 303-04.
205. Id. at 313-14.
206. Frank O. Bowman, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (2010).
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above the standard range. 207 A state judge deciding the
constitutional question about her own state’s sentencing system
likely would cite the language excerpted in that headnote
because the judge would apply the ruling in Blakely by
comparing the sentencing guidelines before her court with those
at issue in Blakely. Another frequently cited Blakely headnote is
one we characterized as “argument” because it took the next step
in the argument framework, stating the prior rule before it was
applied to a new situation:
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” This rule reflects two
longstanding tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence:
that the “truth of every accusation” against a defendant
“should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,” 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343
(1769), and that “an accusation which lacks any particular
fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is . . .
no accusation within the requirements of the common law,
and it is no accusation in reason,” 1 J. Bishop, Criminal
Procedure § 87, p 55 (2d ed. 1872). These principles have
been acknowledged by courts and treatises since the earliest
days of graduated sentencing; we compiled the relevant
authorities in Apprendi, see 530 U.S., at 476-483, 489-490,
n 15, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348; id., at 501-518,

207. 542 U.S. at 299–300. As discussed earlier, see note 153, supra, Lexis applies
unique algorithms to attribute the language of cited cases to headnotes, to match the
language of citing cases to the headnotes in cited cases, and to calculate the numbers of
headnote citations. Because our data was generated by Lexis itself, our results include any
judgment calls Lexis may have needed to make in these first two areas. But counting
relevant headnotes may be another matter. Since our data reports were collected in late
2017, Lexis has rolled out new web interface software, which among other features offers
”highly relevant results” for searches, see, e.g., NexisUni FAQs, NEXISUNI (2017), https:
//www.lexisnexis.com/pdf/academic/nexis-uni/nexis-uni-faq.pdf, meaning that potential
matches are filtered more aggressively and less transparently for potential relevance than
before. Other than new citations added since our data was collected, this is the likely source
of any substantial differences between our computations and Lexis’s displays of headnote
citations counts.
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147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (Thomas, J., concurring),
and need not repeat them here. 208

Figure 4 illustrates the initially very high citation rates for
Blakely—presumably reflecting many early challenges at the
state level—and the steep drop-off thereafter. Soon after
Blakely, the Court decided whether an application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines also violated the Sixth Amendment. In
United States v. Booker, the Court held in an opinion by Justice
Stevens that the Sixth Amendment applied to the Sentencing
Guidelines. 209 In a separate opinion by Justice Breyer, the
Booker Court further concluded that two provisions of
the federal statute that had effectively made the Guidelines
mandatory must be invalidated. 210 In federal courts, Booker
appeared to supersede Blakely as the precedent of choice, thus
accounting for at least some of the rapid decline in citations.
The history of the opinion in Crawford v. Washington211
contrasts with Blakely’s history. A long-running dispute over
interpretation followed Justice Scalia’s majority opinion holding
that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause makes
testimonial hearsay inadmissible unless the declarant is available
for cross-examination. 212 The opinion reconfigured the standard
for determining when the Confrontation Clause permits
admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases, and both state
and federal courts subsequently struggled to define “testimonial
hearsay,” again leading to a long line of subsequent citations.
Here are the Crawford rule and most-cited headnote as
formulated by Justice Scalia:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
208. Id. at 302 (referring to the rule in Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which
provides that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt”) (footnote omitted).
209. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (concluding that Apprendi and Blakely require
“juries, not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing”).
210. Id. at 245 (acknowledging that decision makes Guidelines “effectively advisory”)
(Breyer, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
211. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
212. Id. at 68–69.
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statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination. We leave for another day any effort to spell
out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”10
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These
are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.
___________
10. We acknowledge the Chief Justice’s objection . . . that our refusal to
articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim
uncertainty. But it can hardly be any worse than the status quo. . . . The
difference is that the Roberts test is inherently, and therefore permanently,
unpredictable. 213

That Crawford did not resolve the issue is vividly illustrated by
Justice Scalia’s joining Justice Kagan in dissent nine years later
in Williams v. Illinois. 214 Referring to Crawford as one of the
opinions of which he was most proud, 215 Justice Scalia foresaw
that later decisions might overturn it. 216
c. Citation Standbys Narrowing Plaintiffs’ Options in
Federal Court
Two Scalia majority opinions restricting plaintiffs’ access
to federal courts are often cited, but less frequently followed.

213. Id. at 68.
214. 567 U.S. 50, 118 (2012) (Kagan, Scalia, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ, dissenting);
see also Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev.
847, 875–76 (2012) (arguing that Justice Scalia in Crawford adopted a seemingly brightline rule that turned on the meaning of “testimonial,” not recognizing that the rule would
prove to be unworkable in practice).
215. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Replacement Could Move Court Rightward on Criminal
Justice, CNN (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/07/politics/scalia-criminaljustice-trump/index.html (referring to Justice Scalia’s mention of “groundbreaking
opinions that enhanced the ability of criminal defendants to challenge witnesses face-toface in court”) (quoted in HASEN, supra note 19, at 153).
216. Justice Scalia wrote separately in Ohio v. Clark, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173,
2184 (2015) (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ, concurring), “to protest the Court’s shoveling of fresh
dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in
Crawford.”
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Lujan 217 imposed stringent standing requirements on plaintiffs
in environmental lawsuits, while St. Mary’s 218 made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to pursue their employment discrimination
claims.
Figure 5
Opinion Age and Citations,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

Writing for a six-to-three majority, with one section
garnering only a plurality, Justice Scalia found in Lujan that a
group of environmental organizations lacked standing to
challenge federal regulations. 219 The opinion established a new
principle: standing requires plaintiffs to show a concrete,
discernible injury, not a “conjectural or hypothetical one.”220
Lujan additionally marked a more fundamental shift because
Constitutional standing requirements had never before been used
“to prevent a litigant from pursuing a cause of action statutorily

217.
218.
219.
220.

504 U.S. 555 (1992).
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560–61.
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authorized by Congress.” 221 Since Lujan, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the injury requirement to preclude speculative or
hypothetical injuries but has never precisely defined what
constitutes an “imminent injury.” Instead, the imminent-injury
test has been interpreted in different ways by different courts.222
Although Lujan was controversial, and a dispute about its
correctness might be expected to endure, one empirical study of
D.C. Circuit decisions found that Lujan had influenced judges of
all political stripes similarly by prompting them to discuss
standing more often, and it had measurably pushed conservative
judges to dismiss more cases for lack of justiciability. 223
Narrowing plaintiffs’ opportunities to pursue employment
discrimination claims under Title VII, the Scalia majority
opinion in St. Mary’s adjusted the reach of the McDonnellDouglas framework. 224 Unlike Lujan, where a more compact
rule statement (discussed in part VII(A) above) was the one
most-cited headnote, several headnotes from St. Mary’s were
frequently cited, but together they constituted a similar rule
framework. The first step recounted and manipulated the
McDonnell-Douglas framework:
Under the McDonnell-Douglas scheme, “establishment of
the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.
Burdine, supra, at 254.” To establish a “presumption” is to
say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie
case) produces “a required conclusion in the absence of
explanation” (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination).
1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 67, p. 536
(1977). Thus, the McDonnell Douglas presumption places
upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation
to rebut the prima facie case—i.e., the burden of
“producing evidence” that the adverse employment actions
were taken “for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.”
221. Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving
Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 919, 933 (2008).
222. Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing
Philosophies of Standing Law? 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 220–22 (2014).
223. Fleisher, supra note 221, at 923–24.
224. St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510 (pointing out that if the defendant “has succeeded in
carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . is no longer
relevant”).
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Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. “The defendant must clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,”
reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was
not the cause of the employment action.” Id., at 254–255,
and n. 8. It is important to note, however, that although the
McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of
production to the defendant, “the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.” 450 U.S. at 253.
.....
“If the defendant carries this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,”
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255,” and “drops from the case,” id.,
at 255, n. 10.” The plaintiff then has “the full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate,” through presentation of his
own case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s
witnesses, “that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision,” id., at 256,” and that
race was. He retains that “ultimate burden of persuading the
[trier of fact] that [he] has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.” Ibid. 225

The language captured in the second-most-frequently cited
headnote reiterated that the burden of production becomes
irrelevant after the defendant introduces evidence of legitimate
reasons for its action and that the plaintiff has the burden of
persuasion. And the third-most-frequently cited headnote recaps:
If, on the other hand, the defendant has succeeded in
carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas
framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no
longer relevant. To resurrect it later, after the trier of fact
has determined that what was “produced” to meet the
burden of production is not credible, flies in the face of our
holding in Burdine that to rebut the presumption “[t]he
defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons.” 450 U.S. at 254. The
presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the
defendant to come forward with some response, simply

225. Id. at 506–08.
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drops out of the picture,” at 255. . . . The defendant’s
“production” (whatever its persuasive effect) having been
made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate
question: whether plaintiff has proven “that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against [him]” because of his
race, at 253. The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is
accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the
Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such
rejection, “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is
required.” 226

Within the decade, a conflict had arisen among the federal
courts of appeals about how to interpret St. Mary’s and its
precedential network. 227 Like Lujan, St. Mary’s remains a
frequently cited standby, but the gap between its “follow” and
“cited” citations is large.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most prominent feature of the judicial opinion is
that it is not an isolated exercise of power but part of
a continuing and collective process of conversation
and judgment. 228

Although outcomes and subsequent citations contribute
significantly to the development of the law, the language of the
majority opinion is the precedent that lower courts are expected

226. Id. at 510–11.
227. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000) (noting that court
of appeals had “misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to
prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence”); see also Kenneth R. Davis,
The Equality Principle: How Title VII Can Save Insider Trading Law, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 199, 227 n. 178 (2017) (noting that the St. Mary’s Court eviscerated McDonnell
Douglas’s burden-shifting approach); Ann C. McGinley Rethinking Civil Rights and
Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1443, 1458–59 (1996) (“[T]he St. Mary’s decision, in effect, requires the plaintiff to
produce direct evidence of discrimination or to rebut all of the potential reasons for firing
her, even those never articulated by the defendant”).
228. WHITE, supra note 16, at 264.
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to turn to for direct guidance that speaks to their current
decision. Most of us assume that an opinion’s influence is
largely determined by its language because the language decides
not only this case but all future interpretations: the language
creates flexible standards or black-and-white rules, the language
contracts or expands preexisting rules, the language may be
determined to cover many or few cases. We suspect that some
opinions are more powerfully written than others and will thus
be more influential. As in other kinds of persuasion, we expect
that rhetorical persuasiveness (however that can be obtained)
will ease the way for later judges to accept and more readily
follow an opinion’s rules.
Following the suggestion that Justice Scalia’s opinions
might be written in a fashion that projects greater precedential
significance, 229 we based our study on the rhetoric, defined
broadly, of the Scalia majority opinions. Our analysis revealed
small but important connections between the rhetoric of Justice
Scalia’s majority opinions and the ways in which later courts
relied upon their language.
We focused first on the rhetorical construction of Justice
Scalia’s opinions, and in particular on the rhetorical framing of
his rules and the rhetorical structure of his argument frames.
Justice Scalia was universally known for averring that “the rule
of law is a law of rules” 230 and that the only appropriate
argument frame is the syllogism. 231 Although critics have
pointed out that Justice Scalia’s arguments, like the purported
syllogisms in most legal briefs and opinions, rely on missing,
unstated, or only arguably true premises, his opinions are framed
in take-no-prisoners syllogistic form. 232 Because one appropriate
measure of rhetorical effectiveness is audience response, we
used citations by federal and state courts at all levels over time
to explore that aspect of the Scalia majority opinion.
229. Cross, supra note 3, at 191.
230. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
231. In their book about persuading judges, legal writing guru Bryan Garner and Justice
Scalia recommended that legal writers “think syllogistically” and write the same way.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 41 (2008).
232. See, e.g., Taylor et al., supra note 29, at 137 (introducing an analysis of Justice
Scalia’s penchant for calling others’ views “absurd”).
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A. What Factors Appeared Most Important in How Precedent
Was Used over Time?
We found that the shape of the majority coalition appeared
to contribute more than any other factor to citation rates,
especially over time. 233 Compared with what might have been
expected given their distribution among Justice Scalia’s majority
opinions, we found relatively higher citation rates for
deceptively unanimous opinions and contested majority
opinions. Looking at these opinions together, citations continued
or sometimes re-emerged after an initial period of quiet. This
citation curve might be explained because the concurring or
dissenting opinions gained adherents as the years passed and
later courts continued to debate the meaning or application of a
rule established in a majority opinion.
Next, we found that the characteristics of the audience
mattered both in how a particular opinion would be selected and
in how specific elements of that opinion would be used by later
courts. When the citing court was a federal court of appeals—
that is, when the typical audience for the majority opinion
constituted a panel of three judges along with their career and
recent law-graduate clerks—there was a greater tendency to rely
more extensively on the entire argument framework established
by a Scalia majority opinion. These courts tended to discuss
both the arguments advanced in support of, and the rules
established in, Justice Scalia’s majority opinions; federal district
courts and state courts were somewhat more likely to simply
follow the rules. The institutional role of the lower courts,
including the federal courts of appeals, is to look to precedent
for guidance and either to follow it or to explain its effects on
the lower court’s reasoning. In our project, it appeared that the
federal courts of appeals were spending substantial time on their
reasoning and explanatory functions.
Finally, we found that the rhetorical framing of the rules
might have influenced citation rates in contradictory ways. For
example, if a lower court judge had a hypothetical choice
between a bright-line and easy-to-apply rule and one that
required her to look into many facts or to examine legislative
233. See Parts IV and VII, supra.
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history or other sources for interpretation, she might choose the
time- and cost-effective route. But lower court judges do not
usually have such choices, and instead most have to determine
what to do with the precedent that appears to govern their issue.
In those situations, bright-line rules that are easy to apply may
lead to more “follow” citations by the lower courts, but more
complex and time-consuming applications may lead to a greater
number of total citations over time as the interpretations and
applications are worked out. On the other hand, we suspect that
one possible result of Justice Scalia’s tendency to formulate
maximalist or fundamentalist rules was that more Justices chose
to write concurring or dissenting opinions, and those sources of
alternative reasoning may have resulted in more citations (for all
the opinions) as the lingering disputes resolved themselves over
time.
Many of the recent citation studies rely on sophisticated
analyses that combine various influence measures, but some
researchers have assumed that more citations mean greater
influence. Our results cast doubt on that assumption because of
the finding that Justice Scalia’s contested majority and
deceptively unanimous opinions were more frequently cited by
all levels of lower courts than their distribution among his
opinions would suggest. This leads us to infer that the reason is
not the governing influence of his opinions but the continuing
disputes about the questions presented. 234
Together, these results leave us optimistic about the process
of judicial decisionmaking by lower court judges. 235 Our
findings indicate that later opinion authors are making
thoughtful selections as they engage in the shifting “process of
conversation and judgment” that is carried on among many
different levels of legal communicators. 236

234. Final resolutions of legal disputes are of course rare. Still, we expect that
“influence” means something other than being cited for one side of an argument.
235. See, e.g., Fleisher, supra note 221, at 925 (“[A]re precedential opinions a gross
bludgeon constraining lower court judges only at the broadest level of rhetoric, or a subtle
tool swaying those decision makers in a more nuanced manner? . . . [T]he latter is a more
accurate description.”).
236. WHITE, supra note 16, at 264.
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B. Does the Rhetorical-Computational Method Hold Promise for
Future Research and Analysis?
Coding the content of the large numbers of cases necessary
for content analysis is difficult and time consuming.
Incorporating the headnotes compiled by LexisNexis and
Westlaw into the analysis takes advantage of content analysis
techniques that are widely accepted and have been subject to
some reliability testing. The use of the headnotes should allow
careful researchers to trace and begin to account for networks of
influence of legal doctrine. We found the use of headnotes as
substitutes for rhetorical analysis of full or partial opinions to be
more complicated.
The most important shortcoming of headnotes as tools for
rhetorical analysis is that they are taken out of context, a
shortcoming we tried to accommodate in part by reading the
syllabus of the opinion first and then reading the headnotes in
sequence. In addition, headnotes do not include citations (which
themselves are important for many rhetorical reasons), and
because headnotes are taken out of context, when they are read
separately, even in sequence, the reader may make inferences
about language and structure that do not necessarily reflect the
intent of the author. Again, reflecting the important absence of
context, no headnotes are extracted from the facts section of an
opinion or from the concurring and dissenting opinions, so
analysis of the headnotes alone is incomplete. In future work, we
might adjust our use of headnotes in several ways, including
identifying the portions of the opinion in which the author
intended to establish a new rule. We could trace the influence of
the author’s intended doctrine against the propositions that
actually ended up being influential (that is, other portions of the
opinion that were more often cited by subsequent courts). On the
whole, while the techniques we explore here will never replace
“close reading” for the purposes of rhetorical analysis, this
project has illuminated some of the potential challenges and
analytical promise of attempting to understand judicial authors
and judicial audiences by harnessing a combination of rhetorical
and computational techniques.
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APPENDIX
Following are four randomly selected examples of the
headnote-coding framework we followed. The syllabus, holding,
and Justices’ votes are taken from the electronic versions of the
opinions available on LexisNexis.
1. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988).
SYLLABUS
Respondents, 16 Filipino nationals who served with the
United States Armed Forces during World War II, seek
United States citizenship pursuant to §§ 701 through 705 of
the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended in 1942. Under
§ 702 of the Act, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization was authorized to designate representatives
to receive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant
naturalization outside the United States. In August 1945,
the American Vice Consul in Manila was designated
pursuant to § 702 to naturalize aliens. The Philippine
Government, however, expressed its concern that a mass
migration of newly naturalized veterans would drain the
soon-to-be independent country’s manpower, and so the
naturalization officer’s authority was revoked for a 9month period between October 1945 and August 1946.
Respondents would have been eligible for citizenship under
the provisions of the 1940 Act if they had filed
naturalization applications before the Act expired on
December 31, 1946, but did not do so. More than 30 years
later, they petitioned for naturalization, claiming that the 9month absence of a § 702 naturalization officer violated the
1940 Act and deprived them of rights secured by the Fifth
Amendment. The naturalization examiner, in all of the
cases
consolidated
here,
recommended
against
naturalization, and the District Courts rejected the
naturalization petitions. On respondents’ appeals (some of
which were consolidated), heard in two cases by different
Ninth Circuit panels, the Court of Appeals ultimately held
that the revocation of the Vice Consul’s naturalization
authority violated what it characterized as the 1940 Act’s

Reprinted from LexisNexis with permission. Copyright 2019 LexisNexis. All rights
reserved.

RHETORICAL-COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SCALIA OPINIONS

mandatory language, and that the naturalization of
respondents was an appropriate equitable remedy.
Held:
1. Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by
invocation of equitable powers, nor by any other means
does a court have the power to confer citizenship in
violation of the limitations imposed by Congress in the
exercise of its exclusive constitutional authority over
naturalization. Since respondents have no current statutory
right to citizenship under the expired provisions of the 1940
Act, the Ninth Circuit lacked authority to grant the petitions
for naturalization. The reasoning of INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S.
5—which held that the same official acts as those alleged
here did not give rise to an estoppel that prevented the
Government from invoking the December 31, 1946, cutoff
date in the 1940 Act—suggests the same result as to the
“equitable remedy” theory in this case. Even assuming that,
in reviewing naturalization petitions, federal courts sit as
courts of equity, such courts can no more disregard
statutory provisions than can courts of law. Congress has
given the power to the federal courts to make someone a
citizen as a specific function to be performed in strict
compliance with the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1421(d), which
states that a person may be naturalized “in the manner and
under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter, and not
otherwise.” Pp. 882–885.
2. Assuming that respondents can properly invoke the
Constitution’s protections, and granting that they had
statutory entitlements to naturalization, there is no merit to
their contention that the revocation of the Vice Consul’s
naturalization authority deprived them of their rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under
its equal protection component. Respondents were not
entitled to individualized notice of any statutory rights and
to the continuous presence of a naturalization officer in the
Philippines from October 1945 until July 1946. Moreover,
the historical record does not support the contention that
the actions at issue here were motivated by any racial
animus. Pp. 885–886.
3. There is no merit to the separate arguments of
respondents Litonjua and Manzano, including the argument
that the Government did not introduce any evidence in their
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cases concerning the historical events at issue. It is well
settled that the burden is on the alien applicant to establish
his eligibility for citizenship. Pp. 886–887.
JUDGES: SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE,
MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. KENNEDY, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Preexisting Rule [HN1] See § 701 of the Nationality Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137.
Preexisting Rule [HN2] See § 702 of the Nationality Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137.
Preexisting Rule [HN3] See § 705 of the Nationality Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137.
Preexisting Rule [HN4] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Argument [HN5] Courts of equity can no more disregard
statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions
than can courts of law. A court of equity cannot, by
avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the
law, create a remedy in violation of law.
Scalia Rule [HN6] An alien who seeks political rights as
a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only
upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts
are without authority to sanction changes or
modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the
legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public
welfare.
Scalia Rule [HN7] Once it has been determined that a
person does not qualify for citizenship, the district court
has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant
citizenship.
Argument [HN8] The burden is on the alien applicant to
show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect.
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2. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
SYLLABUS
During a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol
officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt
pocket, which the driver admitted using to take drugs. The
officer then searched the passenger compartment for
contraband, removing and searching what respondent, a
passenger in the car, claimed was her purse. He found drug
paraphernalia there and arrested respondent on drug
charges. The trial court denied her motion to suppress all
evidence from the purse as the fruit of an unlawful search,
holding that the officer had probable cause to search the car
for contraband, and, by extension, any containers therein
that could hold such contraband. Respondent was
convicted. In reversing, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled
that an officer with probable cause to search a vehicle may
search all containers that might conceal the object of the
search; but, if the officer knows or should know that a
container belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of
criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of
the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal
contraband within it to avoid detection. Applying that rule
here, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Held:
Police officers with probable cause to search a car, as in
this case, may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the
car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.
In determining whether a particular governmental action
violates the Fourth Amendment, this Court inquires first
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under common law when the Amendment was
framed, see, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931,
131 L. Ed. 2d 976, 115 S. Ct. 1914. Where that inquiry
yields no answer, the Court must evaluate the search or
seizure under traditional reasonableness standards by
balancing an individual’s privacy interests against
legitimate governmental interests, see, e.g., Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 564, 115 S. Ct. 2386. This Court has concluded that
the Framers would have regarded as reasonable the
warrantless search of a car that police had probable cause to
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believe contained contraband, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, as well as the
warrantless search of containers within the automobile,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102
S. Ct. 2157. Neither Ross nor the historical evidence it
relied upon admits of a distinction based on ownership. The
analytical principle underlying Ross’s rule is also fully
consistent with the balance of this Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the historical evidence
were equivocal, the balancing of the relative interests
weighs decidedly in favor of searching a passenger’s
belongings. Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property
they transport in cars. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464. The degree
of intrusiveness of a package search upon personal privacy
and personal dignity is substantially less than the degree of
intrusiveness of the body searches at issue in United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210
and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100
S. Ct. 338. In contrast to the passenger’s reduced privacy
expectations, the governmental interest in effective law
enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the
ability to search the passenger’s belongings, since an
automobile’s ready mobility creates the risk that evidence
or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is
obtained, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L. Ed. 2d
406, 105 S. Ct. 2066; since a passenger may have an
interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing in a common
enterprise with the driver, cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 413-414, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882; and since a
criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger’s
belongings as readily as in other containers in the car, see,
e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102, 65 L. Ed. 2d
633, 100 S. Ct. 2556. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s
“passenger property” rule would be unworkable in practice.
Finally, an exception from the historical practice described
in Ross protecting only a passenger’s property, rather than
property belonging to anyone other than the driver, would
be less sensible than the rule that a package may be
searched, whether or not its owner is present as a passenger
or otherwise, because it might contain the object of the
search. Pp. 3–11.
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956 P.2d 363, reversed.
JUDGES: SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O’CONNOR,
KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Argument [HN1] U.S. Const. amend. IV protects the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
determining whether a particular governmental action
violates this provision, the court inquires first whether the
action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under
the common law when amend. IV was framed. Where that
inquiry yields no answer, the court must evaluate the search
or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.
Argument [HN2] Contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may
be searched for without a warrant where probable cause
exists.
Scalia Rule [HN3] If probable cause justifies the search of
a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search. This applies broadly to all containers within a car,
without qualification as to ownership.
Argument [HN4] The critical element in a reasonable
search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of
crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
specific things to be searched for and seized are located on
the property to which entry is sought.
Scalia Rule [HN5] When there is probable cause to search
for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers to
examine packages and containers without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each one. A passenger’s
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personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or
containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are
in the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for
contraband in the car.
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3. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009).
SYLLABUS
Respondent Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel were
charged with murder and other crimes. Prior to trial, an
informant planted in Ventris’s cell heard him admit to
shooting and robbing the victim, but Ventris testified at
trial that Theel committed the crimes. When the State
sought to call the informant to testify to his contradictory
statement, Ventris objected. The State conceded that
Ventris’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had likely
been violated, but argued that the statement was admissible
for impeachment purposes. The trial court allowed the
testimony. The jury convicted Ventris of aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery. Reversing, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the informant’s statements were
not admissible for any reason, including impeachment.

Held:
Ventris’s statement to the informant, concededly elicited in
violation of the Sixth Amendment, was admissible to
impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. Pp. 590-594.
(a) Whether a confession that was not admissible in the
prosecution’s case in chief nonetheless can be admitted for
impeachment purposes depends on the nature of the
constitutional guarantee violated. The Fifth Amendment
guarantee against compelled self-incrimination is violated
by introducing a coerced confession at trial, whether by
way of impeachment or otherwise. New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450, 458-459, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 59 L. Ed. 2d 501.
But for the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches or seizures, where exclusion comes
by way of deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation
of the substantive guarantee, admissibility is determined by
an exclusionary-rule balancing test. See Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503. The
same is true for violations of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment prophylactic rules forbidding certain pretrial
police conduct. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225-226, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1. The core of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a trial right, but the
right covers pretrial interrogations to ensure that police
manipulation does not deprive the defendant of “‘effective
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid

319

320

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

and advice would help him.’” Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 204, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246. This
right to be free of uncounseled interrogation is infringed at
the time of the interrogation, not when it is admitted into
evidence. It is that deprivation that demands the remedy of
exclusion from the prosecution’s case in chief. Pp. 590593.
(b) The interests safeguarded by excluding tainted evidence
for impeachment purposes are “outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial
process.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488, 96 S. Ct.
3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067. Once the defendant testifies
inconsistently, denying the prosecution “the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary process,” Harris,
supra, at 225, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, is a high price
to pay for vindicating the right to counsel at the prior stage.
On the other hand, preventing impeachment use of
statements taken in violation of Massiah would add little
appreciable deterrence for officers, who have an incentive
to comply with the Constitution, since statements lawfully
obtained can be used for all purposes, not simply
impeachment. In every other context, this Court has held
that tainted evidence is admissible for impeachment.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723, 95 S. Ct.
1215, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570. No distinction here alters that
balance. Pp. 593-594.
285 Kan. 595, 176 P. 3d 920, reversed and remanded.
JUDGES: Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer,
and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 594.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Argument [HN1] The Sixth Amendment, applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
assistance of counsel for his defense. The core of this right
has historically been, and remains today, the opportunity for
a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him
investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial. However,
the right extends to having counsel present at various pretrial
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“critical” interactions between the defendant and the State,
including the deliberate elicitation by law enforcement
officers (and their agents) of statements pertaining to the
charge.
Argument.[HN2] Whether otherwise excluded evidence can
be admitted for purposes of impeachment depends upon the
nature of the constitutional guarantee that is violated.
Sometimes that explicitly mandates exclusion from trial, and
sometimes it does not. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that
no person shall be compelled to give evidence against
himself, and so is violated whenever a truly coerced
confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of
impeachment or otherwise. The Fourth Amendment, on the
other hand, guarantees that no person shall be subjected to
unreasonable searches or seizures, and says nothing about
excluding their fruits from evidence; exclusion comes by
way of deterrent sanction rather than to avoid violation of the
substantive guarantee. Inadmissibility has not been
automatic, therefore, but the U.S. Supreme Court has instead
applied an exclusionary-rule balancing test. The same is true
for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prophylactic
rules forbidding certain pretrial police conduct.
Argument [HN3] The core of the right to counsel is indeed a
trial right, ensuring that the prosecution’s case is subjected to
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. But U.S.
Supreme Court opinions under the Sixth Amendment, as
under the Fifth, have held that the right covers pretrial
interrogations to ensure that police manipulation does not
render counsel entirely impotent—depriving the defendant of
effective representation by counsel at the only stage when
legal aid and advice would help him.
Argument [HN4] The Massiah right is a right to be free of
uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the
interrogation. That is when the assistance of counsel is
denied.
Argument [HN5] Post-charge deliberate elicitation of
statements without the defendant’s counsel or a valid waiver
of counsel is not intrinsically unlawful when the questioning
is unrelated to charged crimes—the Sixth Amendment right
is offense specific. However, officers may not badger
counseled defendants about charged crimes so long as they
do not use information they gain.
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Scalia Rule [HN6] The game of excluding tainted evidence
for impeachment purposes is not worth the candle. The
interests safeguarded by such exclusion are outweighed by
the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the
trial process. It is one thing to say that the Government
cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully
obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths. Once the defendant testifies in a way that
contradicts prior statements, denying the prosecution use of
the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process
is a high price to pay for vindication of the right to counsel at
the prior stage.
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4. Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015).
SYLLABUS
Petitioner Whitfield, fleeing a botched bank robbery,
entered 79-year-old Mary Parnell’s home and guided a
terrified Parnell from a hallway to a room a few feet away,
where she suffered a fatal heart attack. He was convicted
of, among other things, violating 18 U.S.C. §2113(e),
which establishes enhanced penalties for anyone who
“forces any person to accompany him without the consent
of such person” in the course of committing or fleeing from
a bank robbery. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the
movement Whitfield required Parnell to make satisfied the
forced-accompaniment requirement, rejecting his argument
that §2113(e) requires “substantial” movement.

Held:
A bank robber “forces [a] person to accompany him,” for
purposes of §2113(e), when he forces that person to go
somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely
within a single building or over a short distance, as was the
case here. At the time the forced-accompaniment provision
was enacted, just as today, to “accompany” someone meant
to “go with” him. The word does not, as Whitfield
contends, connote movement over a substantial distance.
Accompaniment requires movement that would normally
be described as from one place to another. Here, Whitfield
forced Parnell to accompany him for at least several feet,
from one room to another, and that surely sufficed. The
severity of the penalties for a forced-accompaniment
conviction—a mandatory minimum of 10 years, and a
maximum of life imprisonment—does not militate against
this interpretation, for the danger of a forced
accompaniment does not vary depending on the distance
traversed. This reading also does not make any other part of
§2113’s graduated penalty scheme superfluous. Pp. ___ ___, 190 L. Ed. 2d, at 659-661.
548 Fed. Appx. 70, affirmed.
JUDGES: Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
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LexisNexis® Headnotes
Argument [HN1] Federal law establishes enhanced penalties
for anyone who forces any person to accompany him in the
course of committing or fleeing from a bank robbery. 18
U.S.C.S. § 2113(e).
Preexisting Rule [HN2] See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(e).
Scalia Rule Congress enacted the forced-accompaniment
provision that appears in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113 in 1934 after an
outbreak of bank robberies committed by John Dillinger and
others. Section 2113 has been amended frequently, but the
relevant phrase—“forces any person to accompany him
without the consent of such person”—has remained
unchanged, and so presumptively retains its original
meaning. In 1934, just as today, to accompany someone
meant to go with him. The word does not connote movement
over a substantial distance. It was, and still is, perfectly
natural to speak of accompanying someone over a relatively
short distance, for example: from one area within a bank to
the vault; to the altar at a wedding; up the stairway; or into,
out of, or across a room.
Scalia Rule [HN4] It is true enough that accompaniment
does not embrace minimal movement—for example, the
movement of a bank teller’s feet when a robber grabs her
arm. It must constitute movement that would normally be
described as from one place to another, even if only from one
spot within a room or outdoors to a different one.
Scalia Rule [HN5] It does not seem that the danger of a
forced accompaniment varies with the distance traversed.
Consider, for example, a hostage-taker’s movement of one of
his victims a short distance to a window, where she would be
exposed to police fire; or his use of a victim as a human
shield as he approaches the door. And even if the United
States Supreme Court thought otherwise, it would have no
authority to add a limitation the statute plainly does not
contain. The Congress that wrote 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(e) may
well have had most prominently in mind John Dillinger’s
driving off with hostages, but it enacted a provision which
goes well beyond that. It is simply not in accord with English
usage to give “accompany” a meaning that covers only large
distances.
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Argument [HN6] 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113’s graduated penalty
scheme prescribes: (1) a 20-year maximum sentence for
bank robbers who use force and violence or intimidation, 18
U.S.C.S. § 2113(a); (2) a 25-year maximum sentence for
those who assault or put in jeopardy the life of another by
the use of a dangerous weapon or device, 18 U.S.C.S. §
2113(d); and (3) a minimum sentence of 10 years, and a
maximum sentence of life, for forced accompaniment, 18
U.S.C.S. § 2113(e).
Argument [HN7] Even if bank robbers always exert some
control over others, it does not follow that they always force
others to accompany them somewhere—that is, to go
somewhere with them. And because 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(a),
(d), and (e) all cover distinct conduct, an interpretation of
“accompany” to mean that a bank robber forces a person to
go somewhere with him does not make any part of § 2113
superfluous.
Scalia Rule [HN8] A bank robber forces a person to
accompany him, for purposes of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(e),
when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even
if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or
over a short distance.
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